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The thesis identifies F/A-18 squadron characteristics that are important 
predictors of maintenance performance and draws insights on the linkage 
between the utilization of engineering and technical services (ETS) and 
maintenance performance measures. Statistical analysis is conducted to identify 
squadron characteristics that have a detectable contribution to the variability of 
the performance measure man-hours per maintenance action, and how much 
additional variability is explained by the squadron that is not accounted for by the 
squadron characteristics already considered.  
Thirty months of data were collected for thirteen active duty Marine Corps 
F/A-18 squadrons. Regression is used to model man-hours per maintenance 
action as a linear combination of explanatory variables that describe the 
squadrons in terms of manpower, inventory, and ETS metrics. The test for 
significance indicates that the model developed in this study is highly likely to 
have better explanatory power than an intercept-only (average) estimate of the 
response variable. The study concludes with recommendations for data 
collection methods that would facilitate the correlation of squadron characteristics 
to ETS utilization. Critical to the success of this approach is the linkage of ETS 
utilization to specific squadron maintenance activities, and the development of 
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The performance and expertise of Naval aviation squadrons is closely tied 
to the performance of their maintenance teams. Aircraft that cannot fly or operate 
in a fully functional manner due to inadequate maintenance seriously harms 
mission capability. It is useful, therefore, to identify factors related to a 
squadron’s mission, and the personnel and assets at its disposal, which help to 
explain the performance of their maintainers.   
How should maintainer performance be measured? The speed and 
correctness with which maintenance actions are conducted are important 
aspects of performance, although they may be difficult to quantify. External 
factors, such as the availability of repair parts and the operations tempo of the 
squadron, also affect measures that may be used to describe maintenance 
performance. Therefore, we use man-hours per maintenance action as a 
measure of performance, due to its direct relationship to the actions of the 
maintainers, and to limits the effects of external confounding factors.   
In this thesis we examine monthly data of thirteen Marine Corps F/A-18 
squadrons taken over a two-year period to identify squadron characteristics that 
are important predictors of man-hours per maintenance action. Also, we gain 
insight on maintenance performance from data collected on the squadrons’ 
utilization of engineering and technical services. Specifically, we address the 
following research questions: 
1. Which squadron characteristics have a detectable contribution to the 
variability of the performance measure man-hours per maintenance action? 
2. How much additional variability is explained by the squadron that is not 
accounted for by the squadron characteristics already considered? 
3. Is there a time-of-year effect for the performance of the squadrons?  
4. What additional metrics not currently available would most likely be 
useful in an explanatory model of maintenance performance? 
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5. What data collection methods, if any, would be likely to improve the 
ability of NATEC managers to correlate squadron characteristics to tech rep 
measures of performance? 
Flight operations rely on a maintenance workforce that can meet the 
demands of a flight schedule by performing preventive and corrective 
maintenance. If necessary, maintenance personnel may request the expertise 
offered by government civil service or civilian contracted personnel, known as 
technical representatives (“tech reps”), who provide engineering and technical 
services (ETS) in the form of on-the-job training, troubleshooting, and additional 
training. 
We integrate data collected from several independent Department of 
Defense sources on maintenance actions, personnel, aircraft inventory, and 
technical services utilization to derive metrics that allow performance and other 
characteristics to be quantified for the thirteen Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons in 
the scope of our study. For each squadron, approximately 30 months of 
observations are collected to quantify performance and descriptive 
characteristics. Personnel metrics quantify the experience levels and turnover 
rates of the squadrons on a monthly basis. Experience is measured by the 
number of months that an individual maintainer has spent in a squadron and in 
the Marine Corps. Inventory metrics characterize the ages and type of F/A-18 
aircraft maintained by a squadron. Technical services metrics quantify the type 
and volume of ETS activity in a squadron for a given month. We also capture the 
operational context in which a squadron performs its mission: combat operations, 
unit deployment program, a carrier deployment, or a between-deployment phase.   
Exploratory data analysis shows that performance cannot be explained by 
any single squadron characteristic. Linear regression is used to model man-
hours per maintenance action as a linear combination of explanatory variables. A 
test for significance indicates that the model is highly likely to explain the 
variability of the response variable when compared to an intercept-only (average 
response) model. Stepwise reduction is used to reduce the model to a simpler 
model that retains most of its explanatory power. This reduced model indicates 
that five of the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining man-
hours per maintenance action: type equipment code (TEC), average aircraft 
hours in service, median months in squadron, location, and deployment status. 
Nonetheless, this model explains only 20 percent of the variability of the 
response variable. By including a factor that identifies the particular squadron, 
the explanatory capability of the model is increased to approximately 50 percent. 
This suggests that there are important differences between the squadrons that 
explain performance but that are not captured in the variables included in this 
study. The final model takes the form 
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For those factors found to be significant, the coefficients provide some 
insight as to their positive or negative correlation with the performance variable. 
The performance of the maintainers, expressed as man-hours per maintenance 
action, improves (decreases) with increased experience of the maintainers 
(higher values of months in squadron). 
The data do not indicate that there is a time-of-year effect in man-hours 
per maintenance action. However, there is detectable serial correlation in the 
 xvii
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residuals from the regression model, suggesting that there may be temporal 
effects that could be handled with a generalized least squares approach.  
The thesis is constrained primarily by the short time frame of the study, a 
result of the attempt to include the relatively recent ETS data in the analysis. At 
the time of this writing, ELAR is a nascent database with records of varying 
degrees of completeness. In a broader sense, NATEC’s ELAR initiative and this 
thesis are both part of a larger effort to link maintenance utilization metrics, one 
of which is ETS utilization, with maintenance performance measures. As the 
quality and scope of ELAR data reporting improve, ELAR will play a more 
effective role in establishing a linkage between ETS utilization and Naval aviation 
maintenance performance. In addition, the explanatory power of the model would 
likely improve with more accurate model estimates obtained from data collected 
over a longer period of time, and from the inclusion of maintenance performance 
metrics not currently available in the maintenance data system.  
The study concludes with recommendations for data improvement. We 
determine that a critical requirement for making the tech rep data more valuable 
to analysis is the linking of their activity to specific squadron maintenance 
activity—through NALCOMIS, for example. This will allow a direct measure of 
their impact on readiness and performance in a way similar to other maintenance 
factors.    
Also vital to the description of squadron capability is the development of 
methods to quantify the training currency of the maintainers. This will allow real-
time assessment of maintenance proficiency and will highlight skill areas that 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express 
it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot 
measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the 
beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, 
advanced to the stage of science, what ever the matter may be. 
Lord Kelvin 1824-1907, British scientist 
A. BACKGROUND  
1. The Value of Human Capital 
We have evolved from an industrial age during which assets were 
tangible, countable, and of a measurable value, to a modern era, characterized 
by the need for and availability of information. Today’s organizations are unique 
in that a large percentage of their worth lies in the value of their human capital 
rather than its physical assets. In the past three decades, both public and private 
industry has been forced to streamline operations in the face of reduced budgets, 
smaller margins, and focused competition. At the heart of this struggle is the 
need to measure the value of that human capital—its output and its capacity to 
produce.  
This problem is not confined to the corporate world of the balance sheet 
and the profit and loss statement; with limited resources, the U.S. Department of 
Defense also needs to maximize the output of its personnel and equipment. The 
services have seen an additional focus on force transformation [Rumsfeld, 2003]; 
such a level of productivity demands streamlined, optimized operations. In the 
face of these requirements, leaders strive to develop metrics that will enable 
them to accurately measure productivity and the factors that improve it. 
2. Aviation Maintenance 
A functional area under continued scrutiny in both the civilian and military 
sectors is that of aviation maintenance. Although their missions are different, as 
are the environments in which their missions are executed, both military and 
civilian flight operations rely on a maintenance workforce that can meet the 
2 
demands of a flight schedule. Civilian organizations may see sub-optimal 
performance reflected in reduced profit. The armed services, on the other hand, 
may not see immediate ramifications of poor performance. The ultimate test for 
any military unit is combat, but with sporadic combat operations, the 
consequences of inferior maintenance performance are not always apparent.  
An understanding of the functions of aviation maintenance helps to explain 
how analysts attempt to measure performance. In the most basic terms, the 
mission of any aviation maintenance organization is straightforward: to maintain 
aircraft through routine scheduled maintenance and to repair aircraft that become 
inoperable due to normal use and wear. Aviation maintenance managers must 
strike the proper balance between scheduled and unscheduled maintenance to 
meet the demands of a squadron’s flight schedule while preserving the long-term 
health of the fleet.  
All military flying units have the ability to perform a limited level of 
maintenance on their own inventory of aircraft. During the course of an operating 
day, any aircraft malfunctions that are not discovered by the maintainers through 
routine inspection are usually brought to their attention by the aircrew that 
discover them either before, during, or after a flight. The aircrew and 
maintenance personnel record these discrepancies electronically, which initiates 
the maintenance process required to address the discrepancy. The discrepancy 
record also contains the repair time, man-hours expended, parts removed and 
replaced, and other descriptive information. The purpose of such data collection 
is to allow maintenance analysts to identify trends that may point to problem 
areas such as high-fault subsystems and repeat discrepancies.  
3. Engineering and Technical Services 
Throughout the course of maintenance being performed on the aircraft—a 
process that ends with the action being approved by a responsible authority—
maintenance personnel (“maintainers”) diagnose the discrepancy by referencing 
their own training and experience, technical publications with prescribed 
troubleshooting techniques, and other personnel who may have performed 
similar maintenance in the past. If necessary, maintainers may request the 
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expertise offered by government civil service or civilian contracted personnel who 
provide engineering and technical services. In addition to providing on-site 
troubleshooting expertise, these service providers, referred to as “tech reps” for 
short, supplement the training of maintenance personnel by providing more 
formal instruction in classroom settings and in squadron work centers.   
In the Department of the Navy, tech reps are managed by the Naval Air 
Technical Data and Engineering Service Command (NATEC). The origin of what 
is now NATEC—formerly known as NAESU (Naval Aviation Engineering Service 
Unit)—was the response, in WWII, to the shortage of trained electronics 
technicians. Now responsible for all areas of engineering and technical data, 
NATEC documents requests for assistance in a database called ELAR (ETS 
Local Assistance Request). ELAR records are generally initiated by the 
maintenance activity that requests NATEC support. The requests are approved 
and apportioned by a NATEC detachment supervisor, and are finalized with brief 
customer satisfaction comments from the originator upon completion of the 
action. 
NATEC’s customers—the flying squadrons of the Navy and Marine 
Corps—have grown accustomed to having the availability of the tech reps at their 
disposal even during operational deployments. However, NATEC must allocate 
its limited resources to meet the competing demands of its customers. Such an 
allocation involves determining the best performance value return on manpower 
resource investment. NATEC managers, like other maintenance managers, seek 
to define those metrics that best measure the health of the squadrons in order to 
optimize the distribution of their limited resources and maximize customer 
satisfaction. Analyses of tech rep support [Boynton, Seiden, and Vaughan 1995; 
Boynton and Vaughan,1998] describe the difficulties of quantifying tech reps’ 
contributions to aviation readiness. NATEC implemented ELAR in August 2003 in 
an effort to address this problem. Prior to ELAR, the Navy lacked a systematic 
data-collection tool for tracking the utilization of technical services by its aviation 
maintainers. In the absence of such data it is impossible to correlate aviation 
maintainer performance to the usage of these services. At the time of this writing, 
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ELAR contains approximately two years of data, but its early records are 
insufficiently complete to conduct meaningful statistical analyses linking ETS 
utilization to maintenance outcomes. We view the continual improvement of 
ELAR and this thesis as parts of a larger effort to link characteristics of aviation 
maintainer communities, including their ETS utilization, to maintenance 
performance measures. We expect that as the quantity and quality of ELAR data 
continues to increase, greater success in this endeavor will be realized. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We proceed with a review of literature that addresses the analysis of 
aviation maintenance performance. Of particular interest to us are studies that 
measure the contribution of maintainers to the performance of U.S. military 
aviation fighting units. We begin our review with research concerned with 
measuring performance. We then address studies supported by the United 
States Air Force, an organization that faces maintenance performance issues 
similar to those of the Naval Aviation community. Finally, we address studies on 
the effectiveness of engineering and technical services. 
1. Measuring Performance 
One can quantify the accomplishments of aviation units in many ways: 
missions flown, targets struck, aircraft repaired, etc. Some of these measures are 
operational in nature, indicating the performance of the aircrew and their level of 
training, while others focus on the performance of maintenance personnel. Data 
elements are captured by both aircrew and technicians during and after each 
flight event or maintenance action, allowing analysts to calculate metrics that 
describe the output of the unit’s maintenance effort. Commanders are also 
interested in their unit’s ability to accomplish future missions. To this end, the 
Defense Department and the Services adopted metrics to quantify unit 
readiness. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) [CJCS, 2001] defines readiness as follows: 
5 
Readiness. The ability of US military forces to fight and meet the 
demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the 
synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels. a. unit readiness — 
The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant 
commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived 
from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was 
designed b. joint readiness — The combatant commander’s ability 
to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to 
execute his or her assigned missions. [CJCS, 2001, p. 440]. 
The Training and Readiness Manual (T&R Manual) describes the 
readiness models that standardize training and readiness methodology. Navy 
and Marine Corps aviation decision-makers use these models to plan and budget 
for the appropriate number of sorties and flight hours to support unit readiness 
goals, which in turn places demands on resource (aircraft) readiness. At the unit 
level, commanders and their operational staffs use aircraft to appropriately meet 
training requirements.  
a. Mission Capable (MC) Rates  
Aviation maintenance analysts often focus on aircraft readiness 
rates as a primary maintenance performance indicator. Readiness is measured 
as an overall mission capable (MC) rate, or as not mission capable (NMC) or 
partially mission capable (PMC) rates. Mission capability is adversely impacted 
when a system or subsystem renders an aircraft incapable of performing its 
missions, as when components are removed from an aircraft for repair or 
replacement. System failures that deny mission capability are codified in the 
Mission-Essential Subsystem Matrices (MESM), which are available to the 
maintenance crews of Naval aircraft. The MESM for F/A-18 subsystems can be 
found in Appendix A. 
As noted above, mission capability can be delineated in various 
ways. Fully mission capable (FMC) signifies that an aircraft can perform all of its 
missions. Partially mission capable (PMC) indicates that an aircraft can perform 
one or more—but not all—of its assigned missions. Not mission capable (NMC) 
implies that an aircraft can perform none of its missions, which may be further 
delineated as not mission capable due to maintenance (NMCM) and not mission 
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capable due to supply (NMCS). Not mission capable due to maintenance 
(NMCM) is then distinguished as being due to scheduled (NMCMS) or 
unscheduled (NMCMU) maintenance. Each of these aspects of mission 
capability is used to describe a particular aircraft attached to a squadron, which is 
then aggregated across time to produce monthly aircraft or unit-based rates. For 
example, an aircraft’s accrued MC time is the total time that the aircraft is in 
service less its NMC time. Collectively, these metrics are monitored in the 
Subsystem Capability and Impact Reporting (SCIR) system, which in turn 
provides data to the Maintenance Data System (MDS). The reader is referred to 
OPNAVINST 5442.4M [Chief of Naval Operations, 1990] for a detailed 
discussion of SCIR and MDS. 
The MESM is limited to subsystems that are most likely to affect 
mission success and aircrew safety. As an aircraft is modified through the 
addition of more complex weapons, software, avionics, and even missions, 
commanders and maintenance managers must often deal with critical 
subsystems that are not explicitly listed in the MESM, which is over a decade old 
at the time that this thesis is written. In the absence of common standards of 
interpretation, individual units may introduce variability in the classification of 
mission capability status.  
MC rates are subject to close scrutiny at all levels of command. In 
their testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on National 
Security, Steele and Dake [1998a] use MC rates to chronicle an eight-year 
decline in the readiness of Marine Corps warfighting units. They attribute this 
decline to the aging of the services’ aircraft and the corresponding decrease in 
reliability.  
b. Supply Indicators  
Steele and Dake [1998a] identify a category of replacement parts, 
shortages of which lead to high rates of cannibalization and, consequently, 
increased maintenance workload, as evidenced in overlapping and rotating 
shifts. We infer from their reference to the increased maintenance workload the 
importance of metrics that quantify man-hours required to produce repairs and 
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subsequent sorties. We discuss these in detail in Chapter II. Maintenance 
analysts monitor the NMCS rate to gauge the effects of the supply system on 
readiness. During a maintenance action, the aircraft will go through stages of 
repair that involve Awaiting Maintenance (AWM), Elapsed Maintenance Time 
(EMT), and Awaiting Parts (AWP). The time accrued in AWP status is used as 
another gauge of the supply system. 
c. Readiness Management Tools   
The Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) is 
a data base that was designed to provide the service branches, unified 
commands, and combat support agencies with the ability to monitor readiness of 
warfighting units. GSORTS provides the levels of selected resources and training 
required to undertake the mission(s) for which a unit is responsible. GSORTS 
consists of classified data entered by every operational unit, which they submit at 
monthly intervals or when dictated by other milestones such as unit deployments. 
Senior military officials monitor GSORTS reports to detect deviations from 
desired readiness trends. In their quarterly readiness report to Congress, Steele 
and Dake [1998b] explain how the Marine Corps uses GSORTS as a tool for 
monitoring readiness. They also note that readiness rates should be viewed in 
the proper context, since units operate on a cycle of readiness that accepts lower 
rates during post-deployment times when priorities shift to deploying units:   
 If a unit is reporting low readiness, we first compare the unit’s 
status in the cyclical deployment queue or, in the case of a 
detachment-providing unit, the number of detachments currently 
deployed. If these first-order cuts provide no illumination of the 
problem, the next step is to compare current reporting against 
historical trends [Steele and Dake, 1998b, p.3].  
The GSORTS system categorizes readiness with respect to the 
following: equipment on hand, equipment condition, personnel, and training. The 
reporting unit assigns to each of these categories a rating that is derived from the 
measures of effectiveness for that category. The unit commander also provides a 
subjective overall rating of unit readiness known as the C-rating, in order to 
address intangibles not captured in numerical data.    
Orlansky, Hammon, and Horowitz [1997] seek to identify reliable 
indicators of exercise and combat performance. Specifically, they analyze the 
ability of GSORTS metrics to accurately predict performance: 
Service … indicators include: personnel, training, equipment, 
supply, operating tempo, commitments and deployments, funding, 
and accident rates. Although these indicators appear likely, at least 
intuitively, to influence readiness, no analysis was provided to show 
that variations in any of them are consistently related to variations 
in readiness. Such work needs to be done before one should 
conclude that adding any of these indicators would improve our 
ability to evaluate current or predict future readiness. [Orlansky, 
1997, p. S-3] 
The authors examine the performance metrics used by the 
Services and compare them with measurable results from large-scale exercises, 
readiness evaluations, and combat. They find positive correlation between many 
of the currently used measures of training readiness and unit performance. 
Specifically, they recommend the use of those metrics shown in Figure 1 :  
 
Figure 1  Potential Training Readiness Indicators [Orlansky, 1997, p. IV-2]. 
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In addition to GSORTS, the authors consider several other sources 
of readiness information in their analysis, such as the Type Commander 
Readiness Management System (TRMS), which is a task-based readiness 
management system. At the time of this writing, TRMS does not incorporate 
measures of aviation maintenance training readiness. 
Orlansky, et al. recommend that the following data-driven activity 
be undertaken to define the linkages between readiness and factors that may 
drive readiness:  
1. Analyze (readiness) data to identify short term and long term 
trends, including noise; i.e., short-term, non-significant 
variations. 
2. Where trends are observed, identify the time delays between 
inputs, i.e., resources, process, and outputs—the related 
consequences in …demonstrated combat capability. 
3. Examine indicators for redundancy [that] add little additional 
information about status and trends. 
4. Examine indicators that could be combined by appropriate 
statistical procedures. 
5. Examine the relation between subjective and objective 
indicators of readiness. 
6. Start the collection and analysis of new demonstrated 
performance measures. [Orlansky, 1997, p. V-2]. 
The authors’ recommendations highlight specific areas that should 
be considered in cause-effect studies and that we address in our analysis: 
unexplained variance, lag effects, and multicollinearity, the interdependence 
among explanatory variables.  
Orlansky, et al. cite the findings of Junor and Oi [1996], who 
examine all areas of GSORTS readiness, in addition to training. Junor and Oi 
identify 27 metrics, used by the Navy surface warfare community, that are 
effective in explaining or forecasting GSORTS readiness levels. In related work, 
Robinson, Jondrow, Junor, and Oi [1996] identify trends in Navy readiness. They 
use cluster analysis to divide time-series observations into discrete time intervals 
with minimum variability, and then employ principal components to describe the 
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relationship between these clusters as an indication of trend. They state in their 
findings that readiness tends to move in long slow cycles and that GSORTS is a 
useful measure of readiness. 
Although the studies described above do not address aviation 
maintenance performance metrics specifically, they provide insight into 
approaches and methodologies that prove useful in our analysis.  
2. U.S. Air Force Studies of Maintenance Performance 
The Air Force has devoted considerable effort to measuring maintenance 
performance and its contributing factors. Oliver [2001] examines the readiness 
data of U.S. Air Force F-16C/D aircraft over a ten-year period with the goal of 
identifying those factors that contribute to readiness. He stresses that current Air 
Force readiness forecasting models, while accurate, are predictive rather than 
explanatory models. He compiles nine years of data from aviation maintenance, 
personnel, and logistics sources, such as the Reliability and Maintainability 
Information System (REMIS), the Personnel Data System (PDS), and Manpower 
Data System (MDS), to derive 606 variables that may explain MC rate variability. 
Additionally, Oliver considers versions of each variable that are lagged by one, 
two, three, and four quarters, respectively, resulting in a total of 3030 variables. 
He then reduces the set of variables by eliminating those with low correlation to 
the MC rate, and redundant variables that contribute to multicollinearity. After 
setting aside eight quarters of data as a test set, he employs linear regression 
and stepwise regression to identify the smallest significant model that explains 
MC rates for Air Force F-16 squadrons. His final step is to build a predictive 
model for MC rate that includes only those variables that can be controlled by 
decision-makers.  
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Oliver recognizes that readiness is a complex phenomenon affected by 
many input variables: 
Most of the variables contained within each area are interrelated 
with one another so that changes in one variable may cause a 
“ripple effect” that impacts other variables [and] the research 
indicated that unforeseen changes in the world environment 
(environmental variables) created a series of powerful “ripple 
effects” which lead to a series of decisions that significantly 
influenced mission capable rates. [Oliver, 2001, p. 110] 
Oliver’s study covers the ten-year period during which U.S. military fighting 
forces experienced a substantial decline in readiness, in large part due to 
downsizing after the collapse of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold 
War. In his models Oliver attempts to control for this historical trend in order to 
isolate the effect on readiness due to the manning and experience levels of F-16 
maintainers. He finds that manning (expressed as maintainers per aircraft) and 
experience (expressed as rank, skill level, or job assignment) are highly 
significant in explaining readiness in terms of MC rates.  
In December 2001, the Air Force Logistics Management Agency (AFLMA) 
published The Metrics Handbook for Maintenance Leaders [AFLMA, 2001]. In 
this document, Air Force aircraft maintenance metrics are standardized, defined, 
and their importance explained. This handbook categorizes metrics as leading or 
lagging according to whether the effects that they measure occur early or late in 
the causal chain: 
Leading indicators are those that directly impact maintenance’s 
capability to provide resources to execute the mission. Lagging 
indicators show firmly established trends. In other words, the 
leading indicators will show a problem first, and the lagging 
indicators will follow. [AFLMA, 2001, p. 14] 
MC rate is a lagging metric, as defined by AFLMA. Choosing MC rate as a 
response variable, as does Oliver [2001], calls for the consideration of many 
explanatory variables that precede the manifestation of the lagging metric. 
Leading metrics, such as repeat and recurrence (R/R) rates and 8-hour fix rates, 
however, more immediately reflect the effects of the input variables. In addition to 
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defining performance metrics for aviation maintenance, the handbook provides 
insights into their effective use in the identification of trends, diagnosis of 
problems, and inclusion in narratives directed towards decision-makers.  
Beabout [2003], who develops a visual tool to identify troublesome aircraft 
subsystems, also operates within the context of leading and lagging indicators. 
He offers techniques for separating scheduled maintenance from unscheduled 
maintenance activity to isolate those subsystems that cause high NMC rates. 
In RAND’s Project Air Force case study of an Air Force Fighter Wing, 
Dahlman and Thaler [2000] consider how imbalances in manning lead to 
shortfalls in readiness. The authors begin by describing two competing 
foundations of readiness: a unit’s ability to respond to current operational 
demands of the combatant commanders and its ability to produce future 
capabilities through the rejuvenation of human capital: 
As units are deployed to support contingency operations, they must 
trade off building future capabilities for providing current ones. The 
longer this continues, the more units must postpone or scale back 
upgrade training and life-cycle maintenance of aircraft. Future 
commanders then have a less experienced, less capable force from 
which to draw. [Dahlman and Thaler, 2000, p. 2] 
By acknowledging such competing requirements and the constant loss of 
qualified personnel from the unit, Project Air Force analysts define a ‘healthy’ 
squadron in terms of its appropriate distribution of manpower across all skill 
levels. Specifically, they recommend a mix of maintainer experience that will 
provide adequate on-the-job training (OJT) over time.  
The problem is made evident by drawing analogies to the more familiar 
phenomenon occurring in the area of aircrew training, which ordinarily is 
conducted in an environment in which the number of sorties is constrained by 
utilization rate limits or by budget. As inexperienced pilots join the unit, and 
experienced pilots are transferred to other assignments, an increased 
percentage of the fixed number of overall available sorties must be flown by 
instructor pilots, leaving a smaller percentage of sorties for the junior aircrew. 
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The effect compounds over time, since it takes longer for those junior aircrew to 
meet the minimum requirements to be considered combat proficient. Dahlman 
and Thaler recognize the parallel problem occurring on the maintenance side: 
The dilemma emerges when experienced personnel leave at a 
faster rate than junior personnel can be adequately trained and 
promoted. … The USAF’s response to diminishing retention rates 
largely has been to push more new personnel into critical career 
fields that are losing experienced personnel. This presents the wing 
with a “Catch-22”—it is losing experienced, productive 
maintainers/trainers and gaining inexperienced 3- level trainees, 
who require more of the experienced maintainers/trainers, whom it 
can generally gain only by training 3-levels. In the extreme, the 
additional workload can exacerbate the exodus of experienced 
personnel from the force, further compounding the problem. 
[Dahlman and Thayer, 2000, p. 13] 
Other metrics gathered to support this hypothesis come from surveys of 
maintainers. These surveys indicate that senior maintainers spend a large 
portion of their workday on repair activities, as opposed to training or supervisory 
activities. Also significant, according to their data, is the increased time required 
for advancement from low (“3-level”) to medium (“5-level”) skill levels. The Air 
Force uses “3-level,” “5-level,” and “7-level” designations as indicators of 
experience.  
There is a symbiotic relationship between the maintenance and 
operational sides of an aviation fighting unit:  each must work to the benefit of the 
other. The aircrew need higher utilization rates from the aircraft to achieve the 
higher number of sorties required to train the less experienced aircrew; however, 
higher utilization rates on the aircraft leave less time for maintaining aircraft and 
for training junior maintainers, reinforcing the problems already faced by the 
maintenance community.   Dahlman and Thaler [2000] explain how an imbalance 
in this relationship ultimately is felt in readiness: 
In sum, our analysis indicates a rather severe mismatch between 
resources available to the 388th FW and the day-to-day missions it 
is tasked to accomplish—namely, the requirement to rejuvenate 
human capital. The UTE [utilization] rates are not high enough to 
maintain a healthy pilot inventory. At the same time as UTE rates 
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have come down, TNMCM [total not mission capable due to 
maintenance] and TNMCS [total not mission capable due to supply] 
rates have skyrocketed. Maintenance manning is becoming less 
experienced as junior personnel are pushed into the wing to 
replace a declining force of 5- and 7-levels. Although declining in 
number, experienced maintainers are spending more time 
producing sorties, overwhelming their ability to properly teach the 3-
levels and to upgrade themselves, thereby threatening the long-
term health of the maintainer inventory. [Dahlman and Thaler, 
2000, p. 31] 
Although it seems possible that Naval Aviation organizations would 
experience analogous concerns when faced with similar manning trends, a 
search of literature did not produce objective conclusions to this effect. 
3. NATEC/NAESU Utilization Studies 
In NAESU Management of Technical Services, Boynton, Seiden and 
Vaughan [1995] discuss Naval aviation engineering and technical services (ETS) 
from a management perspective: what it is that tech reps do, who needs their 
services, and to what level their customers are satisfied with these services. The 
authors begin the research by categorizing the various types of engineering and 
technical services from the perspectives of the tech reps and their customers, 
and find that there is a strong correlation between those activities deemed 
important by both the service providers and customers. The authors also address 
the significance of finding measures of performance for ETS, referencing the 
occasional success in identifying specific cost avoidance through the use of tech 
reps and the high perceived value of tech reps, yet acknowledging that no single 
measure has proved especially useful.   
Malcolm [1995] explores NAESU technical reports (NTRs) and aircraft 
reliability and maintainability data to evaluate NAESU performance. NTRs 
document information intended to improve methods and eliminate deficiencies. 
Malcolm defines cost savings as a performance measure, and proposes that 
NTRs can be studied to derive the cost savings associated with the 
implementation of the tech rep recommendations. After analyzing several 




can be used to derive these cost savings. Malcolm acknowledges the 
difficulty in isolating the affects of NTRs, noting that sources of information other 
than NTRs also impact the change process.   
Boynton et al. [1998] continue previous studies and further develop 
organizational measures of effectiveness for NAESU. They conclude that 
accepted measures of industrial productivity are not appropriate measures of 
effectiveness of tech rep activities, primarily because tech rep “output” is not 
defined in quantifiable terms:  
…it would seem that measures of economy and measures of 
effectiveness could be developed for NAESU. Measures of 
productivity, however, would be very difficult and arbitrary. 
Production units of input and output, required to develop 
input/output ratios, are not definable in this kind of intangible, 
knowledge-intensive environment. [Boynton, 1998, p. 20] 
Instead, the authors focus on client satisfaction, economic impact, and 
contribution to NAESU organizational objectives. The authors note that cost 
savings realized by tech rep activity is enjoyed not by NAESU/NATEC but 
instead by the client customer. They also note the difficulty in isolating the tech 
reps’ contributions from other factors that affect readiness. The authors dismiss 
what may seem to be the obvious means of measuring tech rep effectiveness—a 
controlled experiment in which such services are available to some squadrons 
and not others—due to the predictable objections raised by units that would be 
adversely affected by such an experiment. Instead, they recommend the 
development of a periodically administered random survey that addresses broad 
categories of training, liaison, advice, and maintenance, across all customer 
categories, to identify indicators of service quality.      
4. Measuring the Value of Human Capital 
Senior maintenance personnel and tech reps are noteworthy in that they 
have years of experience to draw upon when training less experienced 
maintainers and when troubleshooting aircraft problems. Much of their value, 
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therefore, lies in what industry refers to as “intellectual capital”, an important but 
difficult asset to quantify. Wagner [1998] leverages industry techniques to assess 
the purported loss of intellectual capital attributed to the drawdown of U.S. Air 
Force line officers from 1989 to 1997. He proposes to first measure human 
capital and then match the Air Force’s intellectual needs with its strategic plan. 
Wagner uses measure of human intellectual capital that are analogous to those 
used in industry: education, experience, stability, growth, and efficiency. He 
concludes that increased trends in these measures suggest that although overall 
numbers of Air Force line officers decreased between 1989 and 1997, the Air 
Force managed their intellectual capital effectively. 
C. FOCUS OF THE THESIS 
The primary objective of this thesis is to identify squadron characteristics 
that are important predictors of maintenance performance. In other words, we 
want to determine which characteristics differentiate the squadrons with respect 
to a given performance parameter. We hope that the process will serve as proof 
of concept and can be used as a tool to include other squadron characteristics as 
data becomes available. A secondary objective is to draw insights regarding the 
utility of data currently being collected by NATEC and to make recommendations 
for improvement if appropriate. Specifically, we want to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. Which squadron characteristics have a detectable contribution to the 
variability of the performance measure man-hours per maintenance action? 
2. How much additional variability is explained by the squadron that is not 
accounted for by the squadron characteristics already considered? 
3. Is there a time-of-year effect for the performance of the squadrons?  
4. What additional metrics not currently available would most likely be 
useful in an explanatory model of maintenance performance? 
5. What data collection methods, if any, would be likely to improve the 
ability of NATEC managers to correlate squadron characteristics to tech rep 
measures of performance? 
We address the first three questions in Chapter III, and the last two 
questions in Chapter IV. 
 
D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
We address our research objectives as they pertain to Marine Corps 
squadrons that operate the F/A-18, a multi-role strike fighter flown in both the 
Navy and Marine Corps. Since the Navy and Marine Corps differ somewhat in 
their missions, operational cycles, and other factors, we control for the “service 
effect” by focusing on Marine Corps squadrons. Similarly, differences found in 
reserve and training squadrons are controlled by considering only active duty 
fleet squadrons. The current Marine Corps inventory consists of thirteen active 
duty F/A-18 squadrons of aircraft model types A, C, and D that are included in 
this analysis.  
 
 
Figure 2  Marine Corps F/A-18 Fighter Attack Aircraft.  
F/A-18 aircraft such as that pictured here are operated by squadrons stationed at 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar, CA and MCAS Beaufort, SC. VMFA-
212 is permanently assigned to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan. 
 
Although tech reps interact with maintenance personnel at both the 
intermediate level and organizational (squadron) level, we limit our analysis to 
organizational level (O-level) maintenance. Finally, since NATEC has 
documented the activity of its tech reps in ELAR since August 2003, analysis that 
includes tech rep variables is limited to the time window August 2003 to May 
2005. Data pertaining to variables other than tech rep activities encompasses, at 




Chapter II describes the objective and methodology used in the collection 
of data to support the analysis. After defining the metrics that describe the 
squadrons’ characteristics, we identify the sources of the data that allow us to 
derive these metrics. Chapter III begins with an exploration of the data as time 
series plots. After eliminating redundant variables we employ regression analysis 
techniques to identify those characteristics that are related to performance. 
Chapter IV summarizes the work and makes recommendations for further study.  
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II. DATA COLLECTION 
A. OBJECTIVES  
The purpose of this thesis is to identify squadron characteristics that can 
explain the performance of its maintenance crew. The data collection effort 
supported our analysis by focusing on data elements that describe the squadron 
characteristics in quantifiable terms, and which describe the performance output 
of a squadron’s maintenance department.   
Our goal is to express the various characteristics of the squadrons in 
terms of personnel makeup, aircraft inventory, maintenance activity, and 
operational activity. In this respect we are describing what the squadrons are 
doing, who they’re doing it with, and what they’re doing it with. We want to 
quantify performance in terms of mission capability rates, times to repair, and the 
frequency of certain types of repair. Low capability rates may signify that the 
squadron is not getting sufficient flight hours from the aircraft in its possession. 
Long times to repair may indicate poor maintenance management, slow aircraft 
turnaround activities, or even a lack of personnel capabilities. High frequency of 
repair may be more indicative of a reliability problem than of a maintenance 
problem, so we limited our scope to those types of repair that are indicative of 
maintenance performance. Finally, we need to consider these factors in the 
context of changing operational tempo and deployments, so we obtained data 
that describe squadrons in operational terms as well.  
B.  METHODOLOGY 
We began the data collection effort by identifying metrics that capture the 
squadron characteristics that we want to quantify. With these metrics in mind, we 
identified data sources that contain these metrics (or the raw data that allow them 
to be derived) for the squadrons under consideration in this study. From each of 
these sources, we collected time series data encompassing, at a minimum, the 
period August 2003 through May 2005. Since each of the data sources provides 
data at differing levels of detail, we decided on a time unit that facilitates a useful, 
common level of aggregation. Many available metrics were already aggregated 
on a monthly basis, so further decomposition to a weekly or daily interval was 
avoided. The data also needed to be aggregated to the appropriate 
organizational level. Although some detailed metrics attribute maintenance 
activity to a single aircraft, the squadron is the smallest maintenance organization 
to which all our metrics apply. The data were aggregated to the squadron level 
and filtered to include only the following squadrons: 
Third Marine Aircraft Wing 
Marine Aircraft Group 11 
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA
Second Marine Aircraft Wing 
Marine Aircraft Group 31 








Table 1.   CONUS-Based Active Duty Marine F/A-18 Squadrons 
 
For data elements that are measured over a large number of individuals or 
aircraft in a given month, we use summary statistics such as quartiles to 
condense the data into single values per squadron per month. Each metric, 
therefore, takes the form ,s tX , where  represents the squadron and represents 
the month. For certain metrics we are constrained by the months for which data 
was not collected or made available to us. Since we are analyzing a collection of 
factors across a consistent timeframe, we limited our data collection effort to a 
time frame that was common to each.  
s t
C. METRICS AND THEIR SOURCES 
We identify sources of data that allow us to develop a set of metrics that 
quantify the characteristics of the squadrons in terms of operational activity, 
maintenance activity, personnel makeup, and aircraft inventory. These data 
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sources are not linked and are not designed to share data or commonality of data 
format. As such, we develop metrics that can be brought together on a common 
scale or time increment. Each metric is categorized by its relation to operations, 
maintenance, personnel composition, or aircraft inventory.  
1.  Flight Operations and Maintenance Metrics 
Flight operations metrics are characterized by their relationship to the daily 
flight schedule. We expect the volume of maintenance activity to vary with the 
demands of flight operations. Although operational demands may be beyond the 
control of the maintenance department, we use operational metrics to normalize 
maintenance statistics to a common scale.  
We accessed the Navy’s Maintenance Data System (MDS) to collect the 
data elements used to describe maintenance and performance and flight 
operations. MDS, managed by Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), is a 
management information system designed to provide statistical data on 
equipment maintainability and reliability, configuration, mission capability and 
utilization, material usage and non-availability, and maintenance and material 
processing times and costing. Maintainers and aircrew input data into MDS using 
the Naval Aviation Logistics Command Information System (NALCOMIS), the 
primary maintenance interface that integrates all maintenance functions and 
allows managers to visualize critical maintenance trends through pre-designed or 
customizable reports. For access to data maintained in NALCOMIS, we used the 
web-based Decision Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and 
Technical Evaluation (DECKPLATE), which provides report and query 
capabilities of Naval Aviation logistics and flight event data to compile the 
maintenance and operational characteristics of each squadron. For each of the 
metrics described previously, we collected data for the period October 2002 to 
April 2005. 
From these data sources, we identify operational and maintenance 
metrics that allow us to quantify performance output in measurable terms. We 
group the operational metrics as measures of utilization and operational tempo, 
and group the maintenance metrics as measures of maintainability and reliability.  
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a. Measures of Utilization 
Each squadron operates its aircraft at rates required for training or 
for contingency operations. We anticipated the need to control for these factors 
and therefore collected measures of utilization: flights, flight hours, utilization, and 
deployment status. 
Flights and Flight Hours. These metrics are, respectively, the 
total number of flights and flight hours flown by the entire squadron during the 
designated time period. The flights metric is reported as an integer value, and the 
flight hours metric is reported to the nearest tenth of an hour. We categorize both 
flights and flight hours as performance metrics. 
Utilization. The utilization metric is the average number of hours 
flown per aircraft during a given month, and is reported to the nearest tenth of an 
hour. We categorize this metric as a performance metric. 
b. Measures of Operational Tempo 
Arguably, squadrons that are deployed or approaching their 
deployment date experience higher supply prioritization, better support 
equipment, personnel augmentation, boosted morale, and a higher sense of 
urgency. The metric deployment status attempts to capture these factors. This 
categorical metric distinguishes between the following deployment modalities: 
• Continental U.S. (CONUS) 
• Unit Deployment Program (UDP) 
• U.S. Navy aircraft carrier (CVN) 
• Combat contingencies, which during the time frame of this thesis 
consisted either of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. 
To collect the data that would allow us to categorize the 
deployment status of the squadrons, we turned to various unclassified, publicly 
accessible sources of squadron historical records such as press releases 
[Pasnik, 2005], official squadron web sites and widely-used military synopsis web 
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sites [GlobalSecurity.org, 2005]. Use of deployment status in our analyses allows 
us to control for the operational tempo of a squadron when we compare its 
performance metrics to those of other squadrons. We categorize deployment 
status as an operational metric. 
c. Measures of Availability 
An important descriptor of maintenance performance is the 
proportion of aircraft not available for operations or training. This measure can be 
delineated by the specific reason the aircraft is not available for training – 
ongoing corrective or preventative maintenance, or supply delays.  
Not Mission Capable–Maintenance (NMCM) rate. NMCM is the 
proportion of total reported time that a squadron’s aircraft are not mission 
capable due to maintenance actions required. Low NMCM rates are desirable, 
whereas high NMCM rates may indicate poor maintenance management, 
capabilities, prioritization, or flight operations coordination practices. NMCM rates 
can be further delineated by non-mission capability resulting from scheduled 
maintenance (NMCMS) and unscheduled maintenance (NMCMU). Scheduled 
maintenance can be planned and managed by effective maintenance managers.  
Unscheduled maintenance results from unanticipated breaks. We categorize this 
family of mission-capability measures as performance metrics.  
Not Mission Capable–Supply (NMCS) rate. NMCS is the 
proportion of total possessed time that the squadron’s aircraft are not mission 
capable due to supply reasons. Although some of this time is attributable to 
supply shortages, this metric can also be influenced by maintenance practices. 
Maintenance analysts can identify which parts are responsible for putting an 
aircraft in an NMCS status. Some parts are well known for being on long back-
orders, while others, although usually available, are frequently ordered. We 
categorize NMCS as a performance metric.  
d. Measures of Maintainability 
Man Hours per Flight Hour. This metric provides an indication of 
the amount of maintenance effort associated with each flight hour flown by the 
squadron. A large value of Man Hours per Flight Hour may be associated with 
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older, less reliable aircraft that require additional maintenance, or perhaps an 
indication of a less capable manpower base. We categorize this metric as a 
performance metric. 
Man Hours per Maintenance Action. This metric quantifies the 
average number of man hours required to complete a maintenance action, and is 
calculated by dividing the total number of man hours by the number of 
maintenance actions for each of the 31 months in the data query. Since many 
maintenance actions result from normal equipment failure, while others are 
operationally driven (in that they are triggered by accumulated flight hours), the 
number of maintenance actions is driven largely by circumstances beyond the 
control of the maintenance department. The number of maintenance actions, 
therefore, is not by itself a good indicator of the health of the maintenance 
department. Instead, we use this number as a scaling factor to normalize other 
measures, such as maintenance man hours, to a common scale, which we 
quantify as Man Hours per Maintenance Action. We categorize this metric as a 
performance metric.  
TD Hours. On occasion, squadrons are instructed to incorporate 
changes, such as airframe modifications and avionics upgrades, to the aircraft in 
their possession. These changes are known as technical directives (TDs). TD 
hours quantifies the amount of time dedicated by a squadron to address the 
changes required by TDs. We separate out this type of maintenance activity 
because it may require additional expertise or perhaps external support. Perhaps 
squadrons with higher overall capability levels will accomplish TDs in shorter 
amounts of time. TD hours is quantified in units of hours for a specified squadron 
and month. We categorize TD hours as a performance metric.  
To collect the TD hours metric we accessed the Technical Directive 
Status Accounting (TDSA) database and collected 25 months of data from April 
2003 to April 2005. This metric is reported in hours to the nearest tenth.  
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e.  Measures of Reliability 
Metrics that quantify the frequency of repair are often used to 
evaluate system reliability. Instead, we limited our use of repair-frequency 
metrics to those that characterize maintenance performance rather than aircraft 
reliability. 
Cannibalizations per 100 hrs. This metric is the average number 
of cannibalizations per 100 hours. A cannibalization is the removal of a 
serviceable part from an aircraft to replace an unserviceable part of another 
aircraft. Curtin [2001] testifies to Congress the effects of cannibalizations: 
Cannibalizations have several adverse impacts. They increase 
maintenance costs by increasing workloads, may affect morale and 
the retention of personnel, and sometimes result in the 
unavailability of expensive aircraft for long periods of time. 
Cannibalizations can also create unnecessary mechanical 
problems for maintenance personnel. [Curtin, 2001, p. 2]. 
Since cannibalizations occur when the required parts are not 
immediately available from the supply system, this metric is often used as a 
measure of supply effectiveness. A rising value usually results in an increase in 
the number of man-hours required to achieve the same utilization rates and flight 
hours and risks causing additional problems to the cannibalized aircraft. We 
categorize this metric as a performance metric. 
A799s per Flight Hour. This measure quantifies the frequency of 
circumstances where maintenance personnel are unable to diagnose a problem 
that was identified by the aircrew. Such cases are documented in NALCOMIS 
with the Maintenance Action Code A799, which signifies that the maintenance 
personnel could find no defect and took no corrective action. In some cases, this 
represents a failure on the part of maintainers to resolve a problem. In other 
cases, it represents a failure on the part of the aircrew to appropriately describe 
the problem, or simply the reality that environmental conditions in the repair 
facility are not the same as those under which the failure occurred. We 
categorize this metric as a performance metric. 
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2. Personnel Metrics 
The maintenance organization of a squadron is staffed to handle most of 
the squadron’s maintenance requirements. The ability of a squadron to meet 
operational demands lies largely with the capabilities of the maintenance 
personnel. We attempt to quantify their capability with a variety of personnel 
metrics that may characterize capability to some degree. We develop personnel 
metrics with enough variability to help explain differences in maintenance 
performance on a monthly basis. Manpower metrics that may prove useful in 
quantifying a unit’s capabilities are those that capture the maintainers’ collective 
experience level, as measured by their years or months of service or their time in 
the current squadron. These variables, while not direct measurements of 
individual capability, may serve as useful representatives for such a measure. In 
addition to these measures of experience, we express a unit’s capability with 
measures of stability. 
The personnel metrics we use in the analysis were derived from records 
extracted from the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). MCTFS is the 
single, integrated, personnel and pay system supporting both Active and Reserve 
components of the Marine Corps. To derive the desired metrics, we created 
monthly squadron personnel snapshots for a 24-month period beginning May 
2003. We compiled the records of those personnel that were members of the 
designated squadrons during each of those months. In addition to each 
individual’s name and unit, we collected the following data from MCTFS to allow 
for calculation of desired metrics: 
• Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).  
• Date arrived at current duty station (ArrPermDutySta) 
• Date departed previous duty station (DepPermDutySta) 
• Rank (grade). 
• Months served on active duty (Active Service). 
 
a. Measures of Experience 
We express the capability of a squadron, to a certain extent, in 
terms of the collective experience of the maintenance personnel. 
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Months in Service (lower quartile, median, upper quartile). 
These three metrics quantify the distribution of experience of the maintainers, 
using time in service as a measure of experience. The lower quartile, or 25th 
percentile, is the value such that approximately one-quarter of the sample lies 
below it. The upper quartile, or 75th percentile, is the value such that 
approximately one-quarter of the sample lies above it. About half of the sample, 
therefore, lies between the lower and upper quartiles. The median, or 50th 
percentile, is the value such that about half of the sample lies below and half of 
the sample lies above that value. A Marine Corps F/A-18 squadron is assigned 
approximately 150 maintainers, but the actual number of maintainers in a given 
squadron fluctuates somewhat, especially during the months preceding or 
immediately following a deployment. We aggregate the monthly data of the 
individual maintainers into quartiles to preserve some information about the 
distribution of experience in the squadron, resulting in three metrics for each 
squadron per month. The unit of measure for this metric is months. We 
categorize this metric as a descriptive metric.  
Months in Squadron (lower quartile, median, upper quartile). 
These three metrics quantify the distribution of experience of the maintainers in 
terms of their time in their current squadron. We recognize that individuals’ time 
in the service may be interrupted by duties unrelated to maintenance work. This 
metric eliminates periods of interruption by considering only the time spent in a 
particular squadron. As with the months in service metrics, we aggregate the 
monthly data of the individual maintainers into quartiles, resulting in three 
separate metrics. The unit of measure for this metric is months. We categorize 
this metric as a descriptive metric.    
b. Measures of Stability 
The personnel that comprise the squadrons’ maintenance 
organizations change on a daily basis. We characterize manning stability by the 
frequency, magnitude, and trends of these personnel changes.   
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Turnover rate. This metric expresses stability in terms of the 
number of individuals entering and leaving the organization as a proportion of the 
total number of individuals in the organization. We categorize this metric as a 
descriptive metric.   
3. Aircraft Inventory Metrics  
Although each squadron is assigned twelve F/A-18 aircraft, the 
type/model/series of these aircraft differ between squadrons, as do their accrued 
use and age. To develop the metrics needed to describe inventory 
characteristics, we obtained monthly reports from NAVAIR which were 
compilations of data extracted from the Aircraft Inventory Readiness and 
Reporting System (AIRRS) and SAFE [Kaitchuk, R., personal email 
correspondence, July 10, 2005]. AIRRS provides on-line access to aircraft 
inventory, readiness, and flight utilization data. SAFE is the structural appraisal of 
fatigue effects. Output from AIRRS was made available to us in a series of files, 
each of which was a monthly snapshot of inventory data. Since each squadron 
operates multiple aircraft, we used the mean to represent the distribution of each 
squadron’s inventory metrics for a given month. The following metrics are used to 
quantify these inventory characteristics.  
Type Equipment Code (TEC). Each squadron operates a single 
type/model/series of aircraft. Varying aircraft types may demand different 
maintenance efforts, so we categorize them appropriately. TEC categorizes the 
aircraft type with a four-letter code; the F/A-18A, F/A-18C, and F/A-18D are 
represented by the codes “AMAA,” “AMAF,” and “AMAG,” respectively. We 
categorize this metric as a descriptive metric. 
Airframe Hours. This metric indicates the accrued flight hours that have 
been accumulated over the life of the aircraft during its lifetime, averaged across 
the inventory of aircraft. 
Airframe Months in Service. This field indicates the total number of 
months that each aircraft in the squadron has been in operation since entering 
service.  
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4. Engineering and Technical Support (ETS) Metrics  
As described in the Background section, ETS support is provided by tech 
reps that are available to each squadron. NATEC uses the ELAR database to 
track initiated requests for ETS assistance through execution and completion. 
ELAR records date back to August 2003. We collected all records available, 
filtered to include only those associated with F/A-18 organizations, and 
developed metrics that allow us to include the frequency of these support assists 
in our analysis.  
Records per Month. This metric quantifies the volume of ETS activity by 
quantifying the number of assists provided to the squadrons. We categorize this 
metric as a descriptive metric.   
5. Location and Organization.  
Although we want to identify underlying causes that result in performance 
variation, we might find that performance is explained in part by location and 
factors associated with different operating bases, such as the variety of support 
structures or local policies not otherwise identified in this analysis. Table 1.  lists 
the squadrons and their associated home bases. Since only two bases are 
associated with the squadrons under investigation, we can use a two-level factor 
to identify the observation as either “Beaufort” or “Miramar.”  
We are trying to explain variability in squadron performance by quantifying 
the inherent characteristics of the units with metrics that are applicable to all 
squadrons. However, we have to consider the possibility that some of the 
variance is described by other variables not yet considered. A categorical 
variable indicating the squadron, called organization, will be used to capture 
additional variance due to squadron differences that are not captured by the 
operational, personnel or inventory variables described in this chapter. We 
should note that when using organization as an indicator, we identify location and 
type equipment code (TEC) implicitly, since organization uniquely identifies its 
location and TEC.  
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D.  COMPILATION OF DATA  
Table 2.   summarizes the metrics and the sources of data that we used to derive 
them. 
Data Source Group Metric  Type 
Flights and Flight Hours Performance Measures of Utilization 
Utilization Performance 
NMCM Performance Measures of Availability 
NMCS Performance 
Man-hours per flight hour Performance 





TD hours Performance 
Cannibalizations per flight hour Performance 
NALCOMIS 
Measures of Reliability 
A799s per flight hour Performance 
Months in service quartiles Descriptive Measures of Experience 
Months in squadron quartiles Descriptive 
MCTFS 
Measure of Stability Turnover rate Descriptive 
Aircraft Type Type equipment code Descriptive 
Airframe hours Descriptive 
AIRRS 
Measures of Aircraft Age 
Airframe months in service Descriptive 
ELAR Measure of ETS Activity Records per month Descriptive 
Various Measure of Ops Tempo Deployment Status Descriptive 
N/A Measure of Environment Location Descriptive 
Table 2.   Groups, Types and Sources of Metrics 
 
 
The number of observations  is determined by the number of months (31) 
multiplied by the number of squadrons under investigation (13) for a total of  = 
403 observations of the form
n
n
, ,i s tX , where  = variable number, i s  = squadron, 
and = month. For ease of manipulation we arranged the observations in a table 
of observations (rows) of 24 variables (columns). Some of the observations 
contain missing values for certain variables. Only 209 observations have no 



















The objective of the analysis phase is to describe, in mathematical terms, 
the relationship between active component Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons’ 
descriptive metrics and their performance metrics, which we define in Chapter II.   
B.  APPROACH 
We begin by analyzing trends and variability of the performance and 
descriptive metrics with the use of time series plots and histograms. An 
understanding of trends and patterns provides insights to where measurable 
differences between squadrons may exist, and where there is correlation 
between factors. After discussing the performance metrics, we focus on a single 
performance metric, man-hours per maintenance action, for further analysis. 
Through the use of correlation analysis, we limit the complexity of the model-
building problem by reducing the set of potential predictor variables to a smaller 
representative subset. We then direct our analysis to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. Which squadron characteristics have a detectable contribution to 
the variability of the performance measure man-hours per maintenance action? 
2. How much additional variability is explained by the squadron that is 
not accounted for by the squadron characteristics already considered? 
3. Is there a delayed response (lag) between any of the descriptive 
(predictor) variables and the performance measure (response) variable? 
4. Is there a time-of-year effect for the performance of the squadrons?  
To answer the first question, we use predictor variables and a response 
variable in regression analysis to construct a linear combination of descriptive 
variables that best explains the variability of the squadrons’ performance. To 
answer the second question, we add the categorical variable organization to the 
resulting model, to determine whether the predictive power of the model is 
increased; and if so, to what extent. 
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C.  TIME SERIES EXPLORATION 
1. Performance Measures  
We begin by identifying those metrics that best describe maintenance 
performance. Although we have access to numerous metrics that measure 
maintenance activity, many of them simply count system failures or maintenance 
actions and their frequency. As such, they are measures of reliability rather than 
of maintenance performance, designed to identify to supply-chain analysts those 
critical components that may be exhibiting high rates of failure. These higher 
failure rates could be a result of factors that do not reflect maintainer capability. 
Instead, we focus on those metrics that quantify capabilities of the personnel 
performing the repairs once the failures have occurred. We will limit our initial 
analysis to the following performance metrics as response variables: not mission 
capable due to maintenance, unscheduled (NMCMU), man hours per flight hour, 
man hours per maintenance action, A799 actions per flight hour, and 
cannibalization actions per flight hour. After describing the distributions and 
variability of these five response variables, we will use Man Hours per 
Maintenance Action for more rigorous analysis – as a case study and proof of 
concept for addressing the objectives and primary research questions posed in 
Chapter I.  
a.  Not Mission Capable Due to Maintenance, Unscheduled 
(NMCMU) 
NMCM is the proportion of total Equipment in Service (EIS) time 
that an aircraft is not fully mission-capable due to ongoing maintenance activity. 
NMCMU is more narrowly defined by maintenance of the unscheduled variety. 
Figure 3 depicts the monthly movement of this metric for the thirteen active duty 
Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons. NMCMU ranges from 0 to 0.3, with an average 
value of 0.12, across the squadrons and timeframe considered. 
































Figure 3  NMCMU Time Series for Active Duty Marine Corps F/A-18 
Squadrons. 
Each panel represents 31 months of data for each squadron. Squadron labels 
appear above each time series plot. NMCMU is expressed as a proportion on a 
scale from 0 to 1. 
 
Figure 3 indicates that there is variability in NMCMU both within squadrons and 
between squadrons. In some units, such as VMFA121 and VMFA251, we see 
upward movement of NMCMU for the months between October 2002 and April 
2005, which is not a desirable trend. VMFA242, on the other hand, exhibits a 
decreasing trend. The graph does not indicate obvious dependence between 







b.  Man Hours per Flight Hour and Man Hours per 
Maintenance Action 
The man hours per flight hour metric is calculated by dividing the 
total maintenance man hours in a given month by the flight hours flown in that 
same period. We expect a squadron that flies more flight hours to experience 
higher demands for both corrective and preventative maintenance. By 
normalizing the man-hour data with the number of flight hours, we control for the 
tendency of failures, maintenance actions, and therefore man-hours, to increase 
with flight hours. In this way we hope to isolate personnel capability from 
reliability factors. A problem with the use of flight hours as a scaling factor arises 
when extremely low values of flight hours destabilize those metrics with flight 
hours in the denominator. If we use maintenance actions rather than flight hours 
to normalize the man hours data, we quantify the average number of man hours 
it takes the squadron to complete each maintenance action and isolate 
maintenance activity from an operational factor. An added benefit of scaling with 
maintenance actions is that we do not see extremely low values in the 
denominator of the man hours per maintenance action ratio. Figure 4 depicts the 
movement of man-hours per flight hour and man-hours per maintenance action 
on the same time series plot.  



















































Figure 4  Man-Hours per Flight Hour and Man Hours per Maintenance Action 
Time Series by Squadron. 
Each panel shows 31 months of data for man-hours per flight hour and man-hours per 
maintenance action. Those months with fewer than 50 flight hours have been omitted, 
since they tend to distort the effects of data normalized by flight hours. 
 
Similar movement between the time series plots of Figure 4  
indicates that man-hours per maintenance action and man-hours per plight hour 
may be correlated metrics, and our choice of which is more suitable as a 
performance measure may depend on a more nuanced understanding of how 
they are derived. Values of man-hours per flight hour range from 0 to 34.8, with a 
mean of 7.02. Lower values of this metric suggest a more efficient work force, 
perhaps a result of more experienced or better trained personnel. Some of the 
squadrons, such as VMFA332 and VMFA232, appear to exhibit increasing 
values in these two performance metrics, which is an undesirable trend. Other 
squadrons, such as VMFA224, had individual months during which the man-
37 
38 
hours metrics were remarkably higher than average. In the next section, we will 
attempt to identify those squadron characteristics that explain the monthly 
variability and long-term trending of the man-hours per maintenance action 
metric. 
c. A799s per Flight Hour 
As described in Chapter II, A799s are maintenance actions in which 
the maintainers could not identify the problem and took no further action. If a 
malfunction reported by aircrew is not identified or duplicated by maintenance 
personnel, the aircraft may be determined to be safe for flight and the action 
marked complete with an A799 code. In some cases, this represents a failure on 
the part of maintainers to resolve a problem, while at other times the error lies 
with the aircrew in poor communication or misdiagnosis of the problem. Figure 5 
depicts the movement of this metric over time within squadrons and their 
corresponding least-squares trend lines. 
 
































Figure 5  A799 Maintenance Actions per Flight Hour Time Series for Active 
Duty Marine Corps Squadrons. 
Each panel represents 28 months of data from January 2003 to April 2005. Months 
during which squadrons flew fewer than 50 flight hours have been omitted. 
 
Most squadrons exhibit noticeable variability with respect to this metric. Some 
squadrons, such as VMFA121, 122, 225, 232 and 251 show increasing values of 
this metric, which is an undesirable trend. Others, such as VMFA312, show a 
movement in the desired direction. There is no single obvious characteristic that 
differentiates these particular squadrons, which immediately highlights the need 
for more techniques that can consider multiple variables.  
d.  Cannibalizations per Flight Hour  
Another metric that may provide an indication of maintenance 
performance is the cannibalization rate, expressed as cannibalizations per flight 
hour. Squadrons strive for lower values of this indicator, since higher values 
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reflect a less-responsive supply system and an increase in the man-hours 
required to achieve a desired level of output (flight hours, mission capable 
aircraft, etc). Figure 6 depicts the cannibalizations per flight hour time series with 
least-squares trend lines superimposed. 





































Figure 6  Cannibalizations per Flight Hour Time Series for Active Duty Marine 
Corps F/A-18 Squadrons 
Each panel represents 31 months of observations for a given squadron. Least-squares 
trend lines are superimposed on each squadron’s time series.  
 
VMFA121 shows upward movement in the cannibalizations per flight hour metric, 
which is an undesirable trend, whereas VMFA314 shows desirable downward 
trending. High values of this metric may reflect supply shortfalls, lower personnel 
experience levels, training deficiencies, or mismanagement of resources.  
e. Technical Directive (TD) Hours 
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As described in Chapter II, TD’s are specialized maintenance 
actions, directed by Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), which can be of an 
immediate or less urgent nature. Squadrons are obligated to incorporate those 
TDs that affect flight safety by performing immediate, dedicated repairs, but 
squadrons tend to address those of a less urgent nature when the aircraft are 
undergoing other preventive or corrective maintenance. Some squadrons may 
classify TDs as unscheduled maintenance and will therefore accrue NMCMU 
time [reference Chris Hawes email]. To the extent that this is the case, TDs may 
be correlated with the NMCMU metric. Figure 7 overlays the hours required to 
incorporate these TDs and the NMCMU metric on one plot. 























































Figure 7  NMCMU and TD Hours by Month by Squadron Time Series 
 
For some squadrons, such as VMFA225 and VMFA332, there 
appears to be related movement between the TD hours and NMCMU metrics. To 
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a certain extent, therefore, we may be describing the same performance issue 
with two different metrics. Without considering the number and type of the TDs 
scheduled, TD hours reflect the type/model/series aircraft requiring them more so 
than the performance of the maintainers. Since the squadrons are not usually 
under immediate pressure to complete TDs, the month in which they are 
scheduled, started, and completed is not captured in sufficient detail to develop a 
better metric. A more detailed analysis is required to quantify the portion of 
maintenance that is directly attributable to the incorporation of TDs, normalized 
by the total number of TDs scheduled for action.  
2. Descriptive Metrics  
With performance measures identified, we next identify a set of predictor 
variables to statistically explain these measures. From this point forward, we limit 
our focus to man-hours per maintenance action as our dependant variable, to 
demonstrate the viability of our analytical approach. We examine the predictor 
variables within broad categories of operational, personnel, inventory, and 
technical support metrics.  
We can quickly check for correlation between the response variable man-
hours per maintenance action and our predictor variables with pairwise 
scatterplots, which are shown in Appendix D. The plots do not indicate any 
obvious correlation between the response variable and the predictors. This plot 
also provides an opportunity to eliminate redundant predictor variables. None of 
the scatterplots cause us to eliminate variables at this point.  
a. Operational Metrics 
Deployment status. As described in Chapter II, deployment status 
categorizes the overall operational context of a squadron at a moment in time 
into one of four levels: “IRAQ,” “UDP,” “CVN,” and “CONUS.” “IRAQ” identifies 
those high-priority deployments such as those in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. These particular operations were 
supported by both land-based and carrier-based aircraft during February – May 
2003, and again in the months following September 2004. As indicated in  
 
  
Figure 8 , the land-based squadrons that participated in the 2003 operations—
VMFA-121, VMFA-225, VMFA-225, and VMFA-533—flew nearly three times their 
normal monthly flight hours, and carrier-based squadrons exhibit spikes in flight 
hours as well.  



































Figure 8  Flight Hours per Month and Deployment Status for Marine Corps 
F/A-18 Squadrons. 
Each panel represents a separate squadron’s set of observations for the 31 months 
between October 2002 and April 2005. The deployment status categorical variable 
has four levels:  
“Iraq,” which indicates a combat deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
“CVW,” which indicates a deployment with a carrier air wing 
“UDP,” which indicates a deployment with the Unit Deployment Program 
“CONUS,” which indicates that the squadron is operating within the U.S.  






Other levels of this metric include “CVN” and “UDP,” which indicate the unit’s 
participation in a carrier deployment or Unit Deployment Program deployment 
(UDP), respectively. The UDP program rotates squadrons to bases in the 
Western Pacific Theater of Operations for six-month deployments at regularly 
scheduled intervals. Since the deployment metric moves in discrete jumps every 
few months, it can not explain month-to-month variations in performance. 
However, it may allow us to explain some of the variance in performance by 
representing those characteristics that are not explicitly included – morale, 
urgency, and prioritization.  
b. Personnel Metrics 
Intuitively, the performance of a squadron is related to the quality of 
personnel conducting its work. Our challenge is to identify metrics that capture 
attributes of personnel quality. If we consider the workforce as a dynamic entity 
that accumulates knowledge and experience over time, then the quality of a 
squadron workforce might be expressed as a sum of these factors. Likewise, with 
the loss of experienced personnel comes a loss in the aggregate experience of 
the squadron. We use three metrics to capture this phenomenon: months of 
service, months in squadron, and turnover.  
Months of Service. Again, we expect to see a relationship 
between the capability of the workforce and the quality of work it produces. 
Capability, while not directly measurable, may be reflected in the experience of 
the squadron maintainers. We first define experience as months of service, which 
indicates the total number of months the maintainer has been on active duty. 
From personnel data, the individuals’ months of service is noted at the end of 
each month. Figure 9  shows histograms of months of service for the maintainers 
of the squadrons in our study. It is clear that the distribution of experience is not 
symmetrical. 
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Figure 9  Distribution of Months of Experience of Squadron Maintainers. 
Each panel represents twenty months of data, from May 2003 to December 2004, for 
each of the squadrons in our study. Data represents maintenance personnel only, and 
was not obtained for VMFA-121. Squadron labels are located above each histogram. 
Horizontal axis labels represent months active service; vertical axes represent numbers 
of personnel.  
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The fact that all squadrons exhibit a skewed distribution of months of service 
suggests that most individuals’ experience levels lie below the squadron mean, 
which ranges from 62.4 months of service (VMFA533) to 73.3 months of service 
(VMFA251). Some squadrons do appear to have a wider spread of experience 
levels than others, which may be even more pronounced when viewed across 
time. We use the first quartile, second quartile (median), and third quartile 
together to capture these shape characteristics. For a given month, the value of 
the first quartile indicates that 25 percent of the maintainers in the squadron have 
that many or fewer months on active duty. These quartiles are plotted as a time 
series in Figure 10 . The plots suggest that the second quartile may contain 
redundant information, so we will include only the first and third quartiles when 
considering them for model inclusion.  
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Figure 10  Months of Service Quartiles Time Series. 
Each panel represents 20 months of the months of service quartiles from May 
2003 to December 2005 for active duty Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons. Data for 
VMFA-121 was not obtained.  
 
As Figure 10  shows, the time series exhibit significant movement 
during the period of our study. VMFA251 appears to exhibit an increasing 
experience level in the upper quartile, whereas VMFA232 and 225 show 
declines. Furthermore, the movement of the experience level of the lower quartile 
does not necessarily correspond to that of the upper quartile, as seen with 
VMFA115 and VMFA122. 
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Months in Squadron. If the average accrued time spent in a 
squadron is relatively low, we would expect performance to suffer to some 
degree. Figure 11  depicts the movement of the months in squadron quartiles 
over time for each of the squadrons.  
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Figure 11  Maintainer Months in Squadron Quartiles Compared to Man-Hours 
per Maintenance Action (MMHperMA)  
 
During the two-year period under investigation, we see significant drops in 
squadron experience for some squadrons, and increases for others; again, the 
upper and lower quartiles do not necessarily correspond. When viewed in 
relation to the man-hours performance metric, we don’t see obvious correlation, 
so it is difficult to prefer one particular quartile over another at this stage.  
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Turnover. In addition to varying experience levels of the personnel 
in the squadron, we know that squadrons experience a certain amount of 
turnover—a function of people entering and leaving the organization in any given 
month. Figure 12 depicts the turnover quantities by month, by squadron. 
05/01/2003 11/01/2003 05/01/2004 11/01/2004

































Figure 12  Maintenance Personnel Movement for Marine Corps F/A-18 
Squadrons. 
The panels represent personnel data for the 20 months between May 2003 and 
December 2004. Data for VMFA-121 was not obtained. The grey bars above the 
horizontal line show the number of maintainers that entered the squadron during 
the corresponding month, on a scale from 0 to 60. Similarly, the bars below the 
horizon line indicate the number of maintainers that departed, on a scale from 0 
to -60. The total number of maintainers in the squadron is shown as well, on a 
scale from 0 to 200.   
We can see significant quantities of inbound and outbound 
personnel at specific times during the period under investigation. We capture the 
turnover information in a single metric in which we calculate the total number of 
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inbound and outbound maintenance personnel as a percentage of the total. We 
might expect units with especially high turnover rates to struggle with 
maintenance performance. Figure 13 depicts the turnover for each squadron as a 
time series. 
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Figure 13  Maintenance Personnel Turnover by Squadron Time Series 
Compared to Man-hours per Maintenance Action (MMHperMA). 
Each panel represents observations from an individual Marine Corps F/A-18 
squadron. Squadron labels are above each plot. Turnover is defined as the total 
number of maintenance personnel into and out of the squadron as a proportion of the 
total number of maintenance personnel. The vertical axis for turnover ranges from 0 
to 0.5.  
 
It is apparent that the squadrons occasionally experience relatively 
high levels of turnover, such as VMFA314 and VMFA323. We might expect the 




environment of high personnel turnover. With respect to our performance metric, 
man-hours per maintenance action, the time series plot shows little direct 
correlation to turnover.  
c. Inventory Metrics 
We might reasonably expect older aircraft to exhibit higher failure 
rates and require additional maintenance when compared to newer aircraft. The 
inventory of F/A-18 aircraft operated by the squadrons under investigation differ 
significantly in their age in terms of months of service and accrued hours flown. 
Figure 14  depicts time series of box plots that show the distribution of accrued 
hours on the squadrons’ inventory of aircraft. The oldest lots of aircraft included 
in this data came off the production line in 1986; the newer aircraft, by contrast, 
were accepted by the operating forces in 2000. We can see that the older aircraft 
have nearly twice the accrued flight hours as that of those that operate newer lots 
of aircraft. When viewed as a time series, we see the average ages of aircraft in 
each squadron slowly increase as we might expect. We also see sudden rises 
and falls of the averages, attributable to those points in time where squadron 
exchanged aircraft for operational and service life extension reasons. These 
particular points of aircraft exchange may themselves be an explanatory factor to 

































































































squadron: VMFA-115 squadron: VMFA-122 squadron: VMFA-134
squadron: VMFA-142 squadron: VMFA-212 squadron: VMFA-232
squadron: VMFA-251 squadron: VMFA-312 squadron: VMFA-314
squadron: VMFA-321 squadron: VMFA-323 squadron: VMFAAW-121
squadron: VMFAAW-224 squadron: VMFAAW-225 squadron: VMFAAW-242
 
Figure 14  Boxplots of Airframe Hours by Squadron. 
Each panel represents a time series of boxplots for the 24 months between May 
2003 and April 2005. Each squadron is normally assigned twelve aircraft; 
therefore, each boxplot represents the age distribution (in hours flown) of the 
squadron’s inventory of aircraft, for the corresponding month. The box represents 
all data between the 25th and 75th percentiles. The line inside the box represents 
the median of the distribution. The vertical lines that extend above and below the 
box represent the range of data; horizontal tick marks outside these ranges 
represent outliers.  
 
We reduce the aircraft age distributions to a single metric, average 
aircraft hours in service, and plot the time series of this average along with man-
hours per maintenance action in Figure 15 . The plot does not suggest an 
obvious relationship between the aircraft age and our performance metric man-
hours per maintenance action.   
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Figure 15  Mean Aircraft Hours in Service Compared to Man-Hours per 
Maintenance Action (MMHperMA). 
Each panel represents 28 months of the man-hours per maintenance action metric, 
for the months between January 2003 and April 2005, for Marine Corps F/A-18 
squadrons. MMHperMA is shown on a scale ranging from 0 to 8. Average aircraft 
hours in service metric is shown on a scale ranging from 1500 to 6000 hours.  
 
d. Engineering and Technical Support (ETS) Metrics 
The entry screen for new ELAR records is shown in Appendix B. 
Our goal is to identify metrics related to tech rep utilization that may exhibit 
relationship with performance measures at the squadron level. We simplify the 
search by eliminating ELAR data fields that pertain to subjective comments, 
descriptive text, and freeform feedback.  
Each time a customer initiates a request for ETS support, a new 
ELAR record is generated. Theoretically, the demand for ETS support, reflected 
by the number of tech rep requests received, corresponds with the number of 
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records in the database. During the period August 2003 to April 2005, ELAR 
contains 6,249 records for which the program is categorized as “F-18.” Not all 
squadrons use ELAR with the same regularity, as shown in Figure 16 . We are 
interested in records that can be attributed to a particular squadron. However, of 
these 6,249 F/A-18 records, only 3,176 of these (51 percent) attribute the tech 
rep action to a specific squadron. The situation is improving: after January 2005, 
the squadron data field is almost always present. This improvement 
notwithstanding, we are left with a very short time frame in which to study the 
effects of tech rep actions on squadron performance, using reliable data.  
1/1/2004 6/21/2004 12/10/2004 5/31/2005



























Figure 16  Distribution of Monthly ELAR Records. 
Panels show the time-series distribution of ELAR records between January 2004 and 
June 2005.  
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The distribution shows a sharp decline in the number of records during July and 
August 2004. Either ETS support decreased during this time period or the tech 
reps’ documentation in ELAR diminished for some other reason unknown to us. 
We expect the volume of ETS requests to vary by type of support 
offered. An important role of the tech reps is to provide specific training that 
augments the basic skills training of the maintainers obtained after they complete 
recruit training and prior to their arrival at their first unit. Such skill training is 
usually unique to a specific work center and is conducted during formal and 
informal training in short periods as the schedule permits. Since the conduct of 
this training is not standardized in its conduct or in its documentation, we do not 
quantify it directly in this study. However, the tech reps themselves conduct a 
portion of this training and document such activities as formal training and on the 
job training in their ELAR database. 
TROUBLESHOOTING
































Percentages of Records by Problem Type
 
Figure 17  Pareto Chart Distribution of F/A-18 ELAR Records by Problem Type 
The chart includes the 6249 ELAR records recorded between August 2003 and 
April 2005. The most common problem types—troubleshooting, on-the-job-
training, formal training, and research—account for nearly 90 percent of all 
records. The vertical axis is a percentage scale.  
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In addition to records that are associated with training squadron 
personnel, we can identify any other ETS metrics that are most often 
documented by the tech reps and the requesting units. Figure 17 depicts a 
Pareto plot of the distribution of records by problem type. The first four categories 
of problem type—troubleshooting, on-the-job-training (OJT), formal training, and 
research—account for nearly 90 percent of F/A-18 ELAR records; we therefore 
limit consideration to these problem types. We sum the monthly records into a 
single ELAR metric and plot the changing values as a time series, as shown in 
Figure 18 , compared to the performance metric man-hours per maintenance 
action.  
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Figure 18  ELAR Records Compared to Man-Hours per Maintenance Action. 
Each panel represents data for a Marine Corps F/A-18 squadron. ELAR records are 
limited to the 21 months between August 2003 and April 2005 and to records that 
can be attributed to a specific squadron.  
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Figure 18 indicates that some squadrons, such as VMFA-115, VMFA-232, and 
VMFA-314, report much higher numbers of records on average; it is possible that 
these squadrons have different policies or procedures regarding their compliance 
with ELAR. To build an accurate explanatory model that includes ELAR record 
counts, we would need to explore records with the squadron field missing in 
detail, which is beyond the scope of this research. Chapter III.E. outlines the 
approach we take when analyzing the power of ELAR activity in predicting 
performance variability. Chapter IV discusses improvements in the ELAR 
database tool that could improve analysts’ ability to measure tech rep activity 
accurately.   
e. Location 
Each squadron is associated with a particular location, or home 
station, as listed in Table 1.   We are interested in knowing whether some of the 
variability of man-hours per maintenance action can be explained by the location 
of the squadron. We create a two-level categorical variable location to capture 
this factor. Figure 19 shows the distribution of man-hours per maintenance action 








Figure 19  Boxplots of Man-Hours per Maintenance Action by Location. 
Each boxplot shows the distribution of man-hours per flight hour for the 31 
months of data between October 2002 and April 2005. The two boxplots are for 
Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons based at MCAS Beaufort and MCAS Miramar, 
respectively. The box represents all data between the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
The line inside the box represents the median of the distribution. The vertical 
lines that extend above and below the box represent the range of data; dots 
outside these ranges represent outliers. 
 
Figure 19 indicates that there is a small difference between the distributions of 
Beaufort and Miramar observations with respect to man-hours per maintenance 
action. 
f. Operational Metrics 
As discussed in Section C.2. of this chapter, the Marine Corps 
executes a cyclical readiness policy whereby units that are nearing deployment 
enjoy a focus of effort and maintain a high state of readiness. Conversely, 
returning units receive lower priority and may expect to achieve a lower state of 
readiness. Factors such as personnel morale and sense of urgency are also 
affected by the operational status of the squadron. Since we are aware of these 
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phenomena, we consider deployment status as an explanatory factor in the 
variability of man-hours per maintenance action. Figure 20 shows a time series 
plot of both the performance measure man-hours per maintenance action and 
deployment status. The plots alone do not suggest a direct relationship between 
the two metrics.  


























































Figure 20  Deployment Status Compared to Man-Hours per Maintenance 
Action and Deployment Status. 
 
The man-hours performance metric does not appear to be affected by 
deployment status. We might expect operational deployments to result in an 
increased performance level, reflected in fewer man-hours per maintenance 




g.  Summary of Exploratory Analysis  
We have compiled several variables that we believe may be 
significant in explaining variability of squadron maintenance performance. These 
variables are listed in Table 3.   
 
Variables Source Data Fields Used Data Range 
Man Hours per Maint. Action NALCOMIS man-hours, maintenance actions Oct 02 – Apr 05 
Months of Service Quartiles MCTFS months active service, months active 
service 
May 03 – Dec 04 
May 03 – Dec 04 
Months in Squadron Quartiles MCTFS date of record, date arrived duty station May 03 – Dec 04 
Turnover  MCTFS arrived date, record date May 03 – Dec 04 
Average Aircraft Hours in Service NAVAIR hours in service May 03 – Apr 05 
ELAR Records ELAR N/A Aug 03 – Apr 05 
Deployment Various N/A Oct 02 – Apr 05 
Flight Hours NALCOMIS flight hours Oct 02 – Apr 05 
Location N/A N/A Oct 02 – Apr 05 
Type Equipment Code NALCOMIS type equipment code (TEC) Oct 02 – Apr 05 
Organization N/A N/A Oct 02 – Apr 05 
Table 3.   Table of Potential Predictor and Response Variables. 
Data used in the calculation of the variables in the table are calculated on a monthly basis. For 
personnel data, months in squadron is determined by subtracting the month the individual arrived 
at the duty station from the current month of record. Turnover is calculated by summing inbound 
and outbound personnel and dividing by the total number of maintenance personnel in the 
squadron. Inbound personnel are counted by summing those records, in the given month, for 
which arrived date equals the date of the record.  
 
In the next section we explain the model selection and estimation process, using 
the performance measure man hours per maintenance action as the response 
variable and the other variables of Table 3 as predictor variables. 
 
 
D. PREDICTOR VARIABLE CORRELATION 
Before beginning model selection process, we examine the set of 
predictor variables for indications of redundancy. Figure 21 shows a scatterplot of 
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Figure 21  Personnel Experience Metric Pairwise Scatterplots. 
Each panel represents 240 observations: 20 months of data between August 2003 
and December 2004 for 12 active duty Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons. Personnel 
data from VMFA-121 is not included.  
 
The pair-wise scatter plots suggest fairly high levels of correlation between these 
metrics. The correlation value between months in squadron, first quartile 
(TimeInSqdnQ25) and months in service, first quartile (MoExp1stQ), is 0.81. The 
use of highly correlated predictor variables increases estimation error, and 
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makes it difficult to attribute effects to particular variables. Pair-wise scatter plots 
of the remaining metrics, not including the categorical variables TEC, 
deployment, location or organization, can be found in Appendix D.  
E.  MODEL BUILDING 
With potential areas of multi-collinearity identified, we turn to the problem 
of determining the best combination of the predictors that explain our chosen 
response variable, man-hours per maintenance action. For the analysis, we use 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression to develop an explanatory 
model. The data set we use contains 403 observations of 11 predictor variables. 
However, since some observations contain missing values, the actual number of 
observations used in model estimation depends on which variables are included. 
When including all eleven predictors, we have 20 months of complete data for 12 
of the 13 Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons. Several months of the personnel 
variables are thought to be erroneous and are omitted, leaving a total of 209 
observations with no missing values.  
Each of the  levels of the categorical variables—TEC, location, 
deployment, and organization—are automatically assigned  “dummy” 
variables by the statistics software. For our analysis, we use S-Plus® version 6.2 
[Insightful Corporation, 2003]. Table 4.   lists the variable abbreviations shown in 
S-Plus reports:  
k
1−k




Type equipment code = “AMAA” (F/A-18A) 
Type equipment code = “AMAF” (F/A-18C)  
Type equipment code = “AMAG” (F/A-18D) 
AvgAircraftHrsInSvc Average aircraft hours in service 
MoExp1stQ/2ndQ/MoExp3rdQ Months in service, first quartile/second quartile/third quartile 
TimeInSqdnQ25/Med/Q75 Months in squadron, first quartile/second quartile/third quartile 
Flthrs Flight hours 
Loc Location = “Miramar” 
Table 4.   Variable Coding and Abbreviations in S-Plus Reports.  
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We know that the squadrons’ performance levels differ during any given 
month, but our goal is to identify those characteristics that differentiate the 
squadrons in this respect. We therefore begin by building a least-squares 
regression model without the organization term to see how much of the variability 
can be explained by underlying squadron characteristics. Montgomery, Peck, 
and Vining [2001] give a thorough explanation of linear modeling using least 
squares regression. Finally, we address the first three study questions posed in 
Chapter I: 
1.  Which squadron characteristics have a detectable contribution to 
the variability of the performance measure man-hours per maintenance 
action? 
2.  How much additional variability is explained by the squadron that is 
not accounted for by the squadron characteristics already considered? 
3.  Is there a time-of-year effect for the performance of the squadrons?  
We begin by identifying a statistical model that will apply to all squadrons 
similarly, using measurable characteristics of the squadrons. We then compare 
this model to one that includes the organization term, which captures the 
squadrons directly. Although the latter model may have better explanatory power 
than the former model, it lends less insight into why a particular squadron may 
perform differently from another. By using squadron characteristics to capture 
this effect, we explain maintenance performance in a manner that is applicable 
beyond the thirteen squadrons that were included in our research.   
1. Full Models 
We begin our modeling effort by identifying the linear combination of 
predictor variables that best explains or predicts man hours per maintenance 
action. Using the linear regression utility in S-Plus, the initial full model includes 
all potential predictors as main effects variables. However, rather than include 
organization in the model, we proceed with the regression without an 
organization term and then analyze the distribution of residuals by organization. 
This process will allow us to analyze the added explanatory power of the added 
organization term. 
We express the response variable as a linear combination of predictor 
variables plus an error term. Formally,  
 , 0 1 1, , 2 2, , 3 3, , 4 4, , 5 5, ,
6 6, , 7 7, , 8 8, , 9 9, , 10 10, , 11 11, , ,
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
s t s t s t s t s t s t
εs t s t s t s t s t s t
Y X X X X X
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We have included the full set of predictors in Equation (1). For this model, 
we have 209 observations with no missing values of these variables. The eleven 
predictors and the additional levels needed for the categorical variables 
constitute 14 regression variables plus an intercept term. The plot of the 
residuals against the fitted values indicates non-constant variance of the 
residuals. The plot of the residuals against the fitted values suggests that 
variance of the residuals is not independent of the predicted values. The normal 
plot of residuals also shows some skewing. We therefore transform the response 
variable with a natural logarithm transformation. After transforming the response 
variable accordingly we are left with a full model expressed formally: 
 , 0 1 1, , 2 2, , 3 3, , 4 4, , 5 5, ,
6 6, , 7 7, , 8 8, , 9 9, , 10 10, , 11 11, , ,
ln β β β β β β
β β β β β β
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
s t s t s t s t s t s t
εs t s t s t s t s t s t
Y X X X X X
X X X X X X s t
 (2) 
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The output from this full regression model in S-Plus is shown in Appendix 
E. The summary data from this regression is reproduced in Figure 22 .  
 
Figure 22  Full Model Summary, S-Plus Report. 
The model includes all predictors. The available degrees of freedom are based on the 
number of observations n = 209. p = 15 (14 variables plus the intercept) leaving 194 
degrees of freedom. R2 is derived by dividing error sums of squares by total sums of 
squares and subtracting from 1. The F-statistic is based on p-1=14 and n-p=225 degrees 
of freedom. Variables are abbreviated in S-Plus. TEC = type equipment code; 
MoExp1stQ = months in service, first quartile; AvgAircraftHrsInSvc = average aircraft 
hours in service; TimeInSqdn = months in squadron; Loc = location; Flthrs = flight hours. 
 
An initial indication of the model’s ability to explain the variance is seen in 
the R2 value. The R2 value is calculated by dividing the error sums of squares by 
the total sums of squares and subtracting from 1. As seen in Figure 22, R2 for the 
full model is 0.279. This R2 suggests that approximately 28 percent of the 
variability is explained by this model. However, not all individual variables are 
significant in the presence of the others, as indicated by their p-values. Months in 
squadron (first and third quartiles), months in squadron (first and third quartiles), 
and turnover appear to be insignificant, at the 5% level, in the presence of the 
other variables in this model.  
2. Significant Variables and Model Reduction 
We proceed with stepwise regression to reduce the model to the smallest 
model that retains significant terms. This is implemented in S-Plus software 
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through the stepwise function, which uses Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 
to determine the best reduced model [Insightful, 2001]. The results of the 
stepwise process are shown in Appendix F. Equation (3) expresses the reduced 
model. 
, 0 1 1, , 2 2, , 3 3, , 4 4, ,
5 5, , ,
ln s t s t s t s t s t
s t s t
Y X X X X
X
β β β β β
β ε
= + + + + +
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A summary of the S-Plus output is shown in Error! Reference source not 
found.. The stepwise regression identifies the most significant terms with respect 
to man-hours per maintenance action: type equipment code, average aircraft 
hours in service, location, months in squadron (median), and deployment.   
Since we have transformed the response variable with the natural log 
function, this model explains approximately 26.4% of the variability of the natural 
log of the response variable ,ln( )s tY . To find the relevant value of R
2 that applies 
to the response variable directly, we convert the estimates of ,ln( )s tY  to those 
representing ,s tY  with the exponential function and re-calculate R
2; this procedure 
results in an R2 of 0.18. The F-statistic indicates that the model is significant 
when compared to the intercept-only model. 
From the coefficients of the regression model, we can interpret the 
individual variable effects on the natural logarithm of the performance metric man 
hours per maintenance action. Negative coefficients of numerical variables 
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indicate that predicted values of MMHperMA are higher for the specified level of 
the variable than for the level not shown. For example, expected values of 
MMHperMA decrease for increasing values of TimeInSqdnMed (median of 
months in squadron), which is the intuitive result. Coefficients for categorical 
variables are somewhat harder to interpret. We use analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) as a way of measuring the ratio of variability of a specific factor to the 
unexplained variability (noise); the p-values of the ANOVA table tell us the 
significance of the categorical term as a whole. For example, the TEC term is 
significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
Figure 23  Stepwise Variable Selection, S-Plus Report. 
 
We conduct residual analysis on this reduced model to check the 
assumptions of linear regression. Appendix F shows three residual plots for this 
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regression: the residuals against the fitted values, the responses against the 
fitted values, and the normal quantile-quantile (QQ) plot of the residuals. As seen 
by these plots, the residuals appear to have fairly constant variance and normal 
distribution, their variance appears to be constant, and they appear to be 
independent of the fitted values. 
3. Unexplained Variability in the Performance Measure 
As noted above, this model explains only 18 percent of the variability of 
the man-hours per maintenance action performance measure. In its current form, 
we have left the organization term out of the model, suggesting that the model 
applies to all squadrons. We check the distribution of the residuals by squadron 



















Figure 24  Boxplots of Residuals Grouped by Squadron, Stepwise Reduction 
Model. 
The box represents all data between the 25th and 75th percentiles. The line inside the box 
represents the median of the distribution. The vertical lines that extend above and below 
the box represent the range of data; dots outside these ranges represent outliers.  
 
The plot indicates that the residuals are not evenly distributed among the 
squadrons. The model tends to under-predict MMHperMA for VMFA232, for 
example, and over-predict for VMFA323. We conclude, therefore, that there is 
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variability in the residuals that is attributed to squadron characteristics that we 
have not accounted for with this model.  
We measure the additional information carried by the organization term by 
including the term and fitting a new model. The ANOVA table from the output is 
shown in Figure 25 .  
 
 
Figure 25  Reduced Model, Organization Term Included, S-Plus Report 
 
The R2 value has increased to 0.4887, which is double the explanatory 
power than the model without the organization term. We use ANOVA to test the 
significance of the added term. The results of the ANOVA test, shown in Figure 
26 , indicate that the model with the organization term is significantly better at 
explaining variability of man-hours per maintenance action than the model 
without the organization term.  
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Note that TEC and Location have been removed from the model before 
inclusion of the organization term; this is because these variables are uniquely 
determined by the organization variable. If we include all three terms, we face 
singularity in the design matrix used to calculate the least squares solution. 
 
> anova(lm3,lm3plusOrg) 




Terms  Resid. Df  RSS     Test  Df  Sum of Sq F Value Pr(F)  
1 TEC + AvgAircraftHrsInSvc + Loc + TimeInSqdnMed + Deployment  231  11.21171                                             
2 AvgAircraftHrsInSvc + TimeInSqdnMed + Deployment + Org 223   7.50948  1 vs. 2   8   3.702232  13.74259  3.330669e-016 
Figure 26  ANOVA Test for Significance of Added Organization Term. 
 
4. Measuring Tech Rep Effects with ELAR 
We want to know if the volume of tech rep activity affects the performance 
of the squadrons. We use the number of ELAR records in a given month as a 
measure of tech rep activity. As observed in Section C of this chapter, users of 
ELAR have been regularly recording the squadron field only recently, giving us 
only several months of records to which we can attribute to a specific squadron. 
The method used above is applied to test if there is additional explanatory power 
when adding the ELAR term to the model. We test  
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We then use ANOVA to test for the difference between the two models. We 
further test for the individual affects of the various types of tech rep activities by 
counting ELAR records by problem type and giving each problem type its own 
term in the model. In this way we differentiate between the effects of training-
related activities that precede aircraft malfunctions and those repair-related 
activities that follow aircraft malfunctions. With several years’ worth of additional 
observations, entered regularly by all squadrons, we believe that the techniques 
employed here will be effective in identifying those areas where tech rep activity 
has improved maintenance performance.    
5. Lag Effects 
The various squadron characteristics that explain squadron performance 
might not immediately affect the performance metric. If we believe that some of 
the predictors exhibit a delayed effect on performance, then we lag those 
individual variables backward by the appropriate time interval. For our purposes 
we lag the response variable man-hours per maintenance action forward by one 
month, to check whether the explanatory variables have, in general, have a one-
month delay until reflected in the performance measure. The resulting model, 
formally, is 
 , 1 0 1 1, , 2 2, , , , ,ln ...s t s t s t k k sY X X X t s tβ β β β+ = + + + + +ε  (6) 
which is equivalent to lagging the predictors backward a month: 
 , 0 1 1, , 1 2 2, , 1 , , 1 ,ln ...s t s t s t k k s tY X X X s tβ β β β− − −= + + + + +ε  (7) 
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We are using the performance metric man-hours per maintenance action 
specifically because we believe that it is a leading, not a lagging, indicator. That 
is, we expect little delay between changes in squadron characteristics and the 
resultant change in the leading indicator. For this reason, we do not pursue the 
issue of lagging variables further in this analysis. 
6. Time Effects 
Although we normally consider the possibility of a time-of-year effect in a 
response variable as observed over the course of time, the performance variable 
in this case, man-hours per maintenance action should not be affected by the 
month or quarter during which it is measured. We can think of no reason why the 
squadron performance would fluctuate by quarter. The environmental changes 
experienced by Marine squadrons is affected more by the geographic location 
associated with their current operating base, whether at home base or deployed, 
than it is by the season. Furthermore, to detect monthly or quarterly effects, we 
need several years’ worth of data. For these reasons, we do not include a month 
or quarter factor in the model.  
The data for this analysis were collected as time series observations for 
each of the squadrons under investigation. Each record, therefore, has an 
associated month, quarter, and year. For time series data, we check for serial 
correlation of the residuals to ensure that we do not have time patterns in the 
residuals, indicating a time effect of some sort. Presence of serial correlation may 
cast doubt on the reliability of estimates derived from the fitted model. The 
Durbin-Watson test is a common test for detecting serial correlation of the 
residuals resulting from regression models. Draper and Smith [1981] provide a 
description of this test. We usually assume that the residuals from a linear model 
are independent and normally distributed, and that all serial correlations, 0sρ = . 
We test the null hypothesis 0 : sH 0ρ =  against the alternative, : sa sH ρ ρ= . We 





























to determine whether our residuals call for us to reject the null hypothesis. Since 
our data columns are observations which have been stacked by squadron, we 
“unstack” the data and treat each squadron separately as its own time series of 
observations with its own set of residuals. For each of these sets of residuals we 
form the Durbin-Watson statistic dw , and reject  if  is below a critical value 
obtained from tables such as those published in Draper and Smith [1981]. Use of 
these tables requires three parameters: the level of significance, the number of 
variables and the number of observations. In our case, for 
0H dw
α = 0.05, =20, and 




0ρ ≠ , if < or if dw critdw 4 critdw dw− < , we reject at level 20H α . We 
calculate the statistic for each of the squadrons, and the results are as follows: 
         dw         1-dw     n 
[1,]   1.679851   2.320149  20 
[2,]   1.618424   2.381576  20 
[3,]   1.558493   2.441507  20 
[4,]   2.140955   1.859045  20 
[5,]   1.318383   2.681617  20 
[6,]   1.535749   2.464251  20 
[7,]   1.636940   2.363060  20 
[8,]   2.159661   1.840339  20 
[9,]   1.933646   2.066354  20 
[10,]  1.388049   2.611951  20 
[11,]  1.316829   2.683171  20 
[12,]  2.153625   1.846375  20 
 
Figure 27  Durbin-Watson Test of the Residuals 
dw: the vector of 12 Durbin-Watson statistics calculated from the residuals 
of each squadron’s observations. VMFA-121 has been omitted.  
n: the number of observations for each squadron.  




For α =0.025, we expect approximately 5% of our 2-sided tests to reject . In 
our case, we see that eight of the twelve squadrons have resulted in rejection of 
the null, which leads us to believe that we have some presence of autocorrelation 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this thesis is to identify F/A-18 squadron 
characteristics that are important predictors of maintenance performance. A 
secondary objective is to draw insights on performance from data collected by 
NATEC, in ELAR, on the utilization of engineering and technical services. The 
two-year time frame of our study was a limiting factor in discerning relationships 
for two reasons: it necessarily restricted the levels of change that were possible 
in the squadron attributes that were measured; and in the case of ELAR, it 
implied that the available data represented the “learning curve” of the system. 
Nonetheless, our analysis should provide a useful template for future studies with 
longer time series and with data of higher quality.  
In the following subsections we address the five research questions that 
we posed in Chapter 1. 
1. Significant Variables 
Which squadron characteristics have a detectable contribution to the 
variability of the performance measure man-hours per maintenance action? 
From those variables included in the model selection process, five are found to 
be statistically significant in explaining at least some of the variability of the 
performance metric of this study, man-hours per maintenance action: 
• Type Equipment Code 
• Average aircraft hours in service 
• Location 
• Median, months in squadron 
• Deployment status 
The linear model including these variables explains approximately 28 
percent of the variability of the natural logarithm of man-hours per maintenance 




normal, linear model. For this study, only 20 monthly observations for each of the 
thirteen U.S.-based active duty Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons were complete 
with no missing values.  
2. Squadron Differences 
How much additional variability is explained by the squadron that is 
not accounted for by the squadron characteristics already considered? To 
answer this question, we tested for a significant difference between two models: 
one without the organization term, and the same model with an organization term 
added. We find that by including organization in the model, we are defining a 
different fit for each squadron. We gain significant additional predictive power 
with the inclusion of this term. The value of R2 is improved from approximately 
0.24 to 0.48, which tells us that the squadrons are different in ways for which our 
variables do not account. There is important information in both models. Without 
the organization term, we have a model that applies to all squadrons. This model 
would therefore, presumably, apply to any squadron if its characteristics were 
similar in general to those that formed the model. If we instead allow for a 
different fit for each squadron, by adding the organization term, we obtain a 
model that can be used to predict changes in man-hours per maintenance action 
as conditions change within a particular squadron.  
3. Time Effects and Autocorrelation 
Is there a time-of-year effect for the performance of the squadrons? 
We do not find the quarter term to be significant in the model, so we conclude 
that all quarters are essentially the same. However, this study is limited to 20 
months of complete observations, which is a relatively small set of data to test for 
a quarterly effect. Through employment of the Durbin-Watson test, we do detect 
a slight correlation of the residuals, suggesting that the residuals are not 
independent. There is a temporal structure, although slight, which could be 






1. Additional Variables 
What additional metrics not currently available would most likely be useful 
in an explanatory model of maintenance performance? Our methods depend on 
the aggregation of data by month and on the use of aviation maintenance metrics 
currently available from NALCOMIS. However, many metrics could be derived 
with direct access to the actual records in NALCOMIS. Since we are trying to 
measure maintainer capability, we would like to have as many metrics that 
quantify this capability as possible. Several of the metrics currently unavailable 
that would likely be useful are repeat discrepancy rate, the fix rate, and the 
maintenance efficiency rate. These metrics are recognized by Air Force 
maintenance analysts for their importance [AFLMA, 2001]. The repeat 
discrepancy rate gives an indication of those malfunctions that were thought to 
have been repaired but were not, in effect, repaired correctly. The fix rate is the 
ratio of critical discrepancies repaired to the total critical discrepancies received, 
where critical discrepancies are those that place the aircraft in a not-flyable 
status. The maintenance efficiency ratio is the maintenance actions completed as 
a percentage of those scheduled (in a given time period). 
2. ETS Data Collection 
What data collection methods, if any, would be likely to improve the ability 
of NATEC managers to correlate squadron characteristics to tech rep measures 
of performance? Our goal is to identify tech rep activity that correlates with 
measures of squadron performance. To achieve this goal, we need to link tech 
rep activity to the maintenance activity that the tech reps are assisting and to the 
performance measure that we are analyzing. To link the tech rep activity to the 
specific maintenance activity under investigation, we need a reliable (preferably 
automated) means of identifying specific repair actions with a tech rep. To that 
end, we need one-to-one relationships between the records in ELAR, or its 
equivalent, and those in NALCOMIS.  
This can be achieved in several ways. The (ELAR) database could require 
that an accurate job control number (JCN) from the corresponding NALCOMIS 
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record be entered into each ELAR record. The JCN is a unique number that 
would clearly identify the maintenance action to which the ELAR record applies. 
A more effective solution would be for NALCOMIS to integrate any tech rep 
activity directly with maintenance action. For instance, there is a non-mandatory 
(and therefore seldom-used) block on the maintenance action form (MAF) by 
which tech rep assistance can be identified. More effective, perhaps, would be to  
expand the capability of the MAF to allow for additional tech rep details, such as 
the name of the tech rep, the type of assistance rendered, the actual start time 
and end time of the tech rep action, and any other customer service-type 
information that could quickly be added at the data point-of-entry. Another 
alternative would be to require that the tech rep document his or her actions in 
NALCOMIS before the MAF can be approved by maintenance control 
supervisors.  
3. Real-Time Maintenance Proficiency 
A large part of the tech reps’ value to the squadrons is in their training 
role. Tech reps fill the gaps between initial MOS training and formal follow-on 
school training that is not available to every maintainer. For that reason, there is 
a need to more accurately quantify the training level of the squadron in general 
and of each maintainer specifically. In other words, at any given time, we need to 
be able to obtain a picture of the training levels across a squadron’s maintenance 
department. For aircrews, this is achieved through the use of a training and 
readiness (T&R) syllabus and through the correct demonstration, at regular 
intervals, of mission essential tasks. The maintainers need an analogous list of 
mission essential tasks, specific to their MOS’s, which need to be performed at 
prescribed intervals to maintain proficiency and “currency.” Each repair they 
perform, either on actual discrepancies or in a training setting, “updates” the 
currency of qualification in that specific area of repair. At any point in time, the 
commander (or NATEC) could see areas of maintenance training that have not 
been accomplished in some time (approaching expiration) and must therefore be 
addressed through training. In this way, limited tech rep resources could be 
dedicated to preemptive training in those skill areas deemed to be critical and 
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fleeting, rather than always reacting to an actual aircraft malfunction that 
demands unscheduled maintenance. 
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Analysis of NALCOMIS Records  
Analysis of several years’ of NALCOMIS data records, which would 
include millions of individual flight and maintenance records, would call for 
analytical techniques not addressed here. Algorithmic statistical methods, such 
as clustering, classification trees, and neural networks, could be employed to find 
patterns in the data, which might demonstrate better predictive performance than 
traditional regression methods. For instance, we could use these techniques to 
predict whether or not a maintenance action of a certain type will require 
technical assistance. Other large data sets, such as supply records, could be 
incorporated with similar techniques. For any of these techniques to be useful 
with respect to tech rep performance, for the reasons discussed in Section B.3 of 
this chapter, the records need to have some direct link to tech rep activity.   
2. Survey of Tech Rep Customers   
Current indicators of customer satisfaction are those comments obtained 
from users of tech rep services at the completion of a tech rep action. For 
reasons discussed in Chapter I, the users of tech rep assistance have every 
incentive to request continued ETS support, since they do not “pay” for that 
support. Customers are understandably reluctant, therefore, to submit comments 
that will jeopardize the continued availability of tech reps. If, on the other hand, 
the customers (squadrons) are forced to make tradeoff decisions regarding 
resources, we might see a different picture. One way to obtain a more objective 
input would be to provide squadron commanders a fictitious “budget” that can be 
allocated towards those resources available to them but that they do not normally 
have to pay for: additional fuel, flight hours, personnel, repair parts and 
consumables, and technical services. In this light we could learn the true 
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APPENDIX A 
MISSION ESSENTIAL SUBSYSTEMS MATRIX, F/A-18 
 
Figure A-1. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5442.4M (OPNAVINST 
5442.4M). (1992). Aircraft material condition definitions, mission-essential 
subsystems matrices (MESMS), and Mission Descriptions. 01 July 1992. 
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subsystems matrices (MESMS), and Mission Descriptions. 01 July 1992. 
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APPENDIX B 
DATABASE INTERFACES  
 
Figure B-1. Decision Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical 










Figure B-3. NATEC ETS Local Assistance Request (ELAR) user interface for new 
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Figure D-1. MMHperMA and Personnel Factors Pairwise Scatter Plots. Each squadron’s 
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Figure D-2. MMHperMA and Inventory and Operational Factors Pairwise Scatter Plots. 
Each squadron’s data is indicated with its own color shading. 
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APPENDIX E 
FULL MODEL WITH NATURAL LOG TRANSFORMATION OF 
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
, 0 1 1, , 2 2, , 3 3, , 4 4, , 5 5, ,
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Y X X X X X
X X X X X X s t
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
= + + + + + +






man-hours per maintenance action, squadron s, month t
type equipment code
first quartile, months experience
third quartile, months experience



























first quartile, months in squadron
second quartile, months in squadron




























































Figure E-1. Full Model and Plot of Residuals vs Fitted Values. 
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Figure E-2. Plot of Response vs Fitted Values, Full Model. 
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Figure E-3. Quantile-Quantile Plot of the Residuals, Full Model. 
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STEPWISE REDUCED MODEL  
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Figure F-1.  Reduced Model and Plot of Residuals vs Fitted Values 
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Figure F-2. Response vs Fitted Values, Reduced Model. 
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APPENDIX G 
FINAL MODEL 

























Figure G-1. Plot of Residuals vs Fitted Values, Final Model. 
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Figure G-2. Plot of Response vs Fitted Values, Final Model. 
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